Ten years ago, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed, marking the end of an era of freedom of the seas. For fisheries, however, the era of freedom had ended de facto during the 1970s when a majority of coastal states claimed jurisdiction over the resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) i.e. waters within 200 nautical miles from their shores. The formal passing of the freedom of the seas provided the basis for the special chapter, Marine fisheries in the new era of national jurisdiction, in the State of Food and Agriculture 1980. As noted in that chapter: "The opportunity exists, as never before, for the rational exploitation of marine fisheries. Realization of the opportunity, however, will require major adjustments to the redistribution of benefits from the seas' wealth and improvements in the competence of the coastal states to exercise their newly acquired authority. The 1980s provide the threshold for a new era in the enjoyment of the oceans' wealth in fisheries."
Twelve years have passed since this was written and ten since the signing of the UN convention. It is an appropriate time to take stock of the changes that have occurred in marine fisheries and examine the adjustments that have been made and the challenges that have been met.
This chapter attempts to do just that.
In general, the redistribution of the seas' wealth has proceeded as anticipated, with a few coastal states gaining large benefits and a few distant-water fishing states incurring large losses. Several developments were not foreseen, however. Most notable are the continued investment in large-scale fishing vessels capable of fishing great distances from port, and the significant growth in fishing effort on the high seas beyond the 200-mile limits.
With regard to the improvements in the competence of nations to exercise their newly gained authority, developments in 1980s have proceeded more slowly than anticipated. Coastal states with resources of interest to foreign countries have generally made considerable gains in managing their resources and extracting benefits from the foreign users. But improved management of domestic fisheries still has a long way to go. The task is difficult and many states are reluctant to take the necessary steps to assign and allocate exclusive use rights among their own fishermen.
In addition, environmental issues have become increasingly significant during the decade, posing difficult challenges. The major problems lie in the coastal zones where disparate uses from diverse sources are in conflict and where fisheries receive the brunt of the damage. The problems are particularly urgent for small-scale fishing communities in developing countries.
In general, the 1980s might be considered a period of adjustment to the dramatic changes that occurred in the law of the sea during the 1970s and as well as a period of transition to the eventual achievement of substantial benefits from the ocean's fisheries. Many tasks have to be completed before those benefits can be fully realized, but the size of the rewards justifies a significant increase in the world community's concern for the problems of fisheries management. See Box 1
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The era of Freedom of the seas was initiated in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the struggles to
dominate the oceans and profitable trade routes were resolved by
a mutual accommodation of interests. Fisheries provided one of
the important arguments used to advance the principle of the
freedom of the seas. Hugo Grotius, in his treatise, Mare Liberum
(1608) made two points: first, that fishery resources were so
abundant that no benefits would accrue to exclusive jurisdiction;
and second, that the resources were so extensive that national
jurisdiction could not be effectively defended. Although the
first point was somewhat specious, Grotius' arguments ultimately
prevailed and the freedom of fishing became a major element in
the freedom of the seas. Under the principle, the fishermen of all countries had free and open access to the resources beyond the relatively narrow limits of coastal state jurisdiction; generally within three to twelve nautical miles from shore. The fishermen of Western Europe were the initial beneficiaries. When the herring stocks of the North Sea declined, fishermen moved to the Grand Banks off Newfoundland. As these stocks came under pressure, the fishermen moved to the Grand Banks off Newfoundland. As these stocks came under pressure, they moved south to the banks off New England, following the advice of Captain John Smith who in 1610, reported that the Grand Banks are "so overlaide with fishers as the fishing decayeth and many are constrained to return with a small fraught". And so the pattern was set. With declining catches per vessel in the traditional grounds, the fishermen either moved to new areas or adopted more intensive techniques. All that was required was the capital to invest in larger and more sophisticated vessels and gear. In more recent years, the pace of exploration and exploitation was expedited by the development of automotive power, synthetic fibres nets and refrigeration equipment. Until the Second World War, the distant-water fishing fleets came mostly from Western Europe and Japan. They were followed by the fleets of the former USSR, countries of Eastern Europe and a few developing countries, most notably Cuba, Ghana, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China. United States fishermen extended their activities into the Antarctic for whales during the 1800s and, more recently, into the South Pacific for tuna. During this era, the seas' wealth in fisheries was essentially appropriated by a few states, mostly the developed maritime countries which had the capital and the technology to take advantage of the opportunities offered by open access to the natural resources. Developing countries generally gained little and, in some cases, were harmed by foreign fleets decimating the fish stocks off their coasts. Even where there was no damage, the growing presence of large foreign fishing vessels off their coasts made them increasingly aware of the inequitable distribution of the wealth of the seas. The end of the era was presaged in 1947 when Chile and Peru announced claims of extended jurisdiction up to 200 miles from their coasts. They were joined by Ecuador in 1952. The claims, partially a response to the appearance of United States tuna fleets off their coasts, remained largely a local matter between these states and the United States until 1958, when the issue of extent of jurisdiction was raised at the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. However, neither this Conference nor the second one in 1960 resolved the issue, although a majority of states at that time favoured narrow limits of control. During the 1960s and 1970s, positions changed dramatically. It became much more evident that the supplies of fish stocks were limited and that depletion was becoming more prevalent. Attempts to manage resources through international bodies were proving to be largely ineffective. Many coastal states, developed and developing, felt increasingly threatened by the large fleets of the distant-water states off their coasts. Simultaneously, the issue of control over the mineral resources in the deep ocean beds raised the demands of developing states for a more equitable distribution of ocean wealth. In 1967, the UN General Assembly established a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The mandate of the Committee expanded rapidly to cover all uses and resources of the sea, including fisheries. Interest in the work of the Committee led to a rapid increase in membership and, eventually, to the convening of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973. Concurrently, more and more states unilaterally extended their jurisdiction over fishery resources so that, by the mid- 1970s, a majority of coastal states had asserted claims out to 200 nautical miles. The choice of 200 nautical miles as a limit for fisheries jurisdiction has no relevance to the habits of fish. Some species (e.g. oysters and clams) are sedentary while others (e.g. tuna and salmon) swim vast distances and are found both inside and outside 200-mile limits. There is also no direct connection between the size of fisheries zones and the wealth of their resources. The sea is not a vast bouillabaisse containing uniformly distributed treats, but an ocean of disparity with areas as barren as the Sahara and othors as fertile as a rain forest. Among the latter are the continental shelves which are rich in demersal stocks (groundfish, such as cod and haddock) and the upwelling currents, inhabited by pelagic species (those feeding on the surface, such as sardines and anchoveta). Temperate zone waters tend to contain large populations of relatively few individual species, while tropical waters have small populations of a large number of species. On the open ocean, the stocks are diffused. Some high sea species have schooling habits but require high search costs for their location. Others seldom aggregate and can only be caught using gear that filters great quantities of water. The establishment of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) constitutes an accident of geography and has only limited relevance to the achievement of a more equitable distribution of wealth. Its most important function has been to provide coastal states with the authority to manage the resources within these zones. |
World marine fisheries production has increased almost fivefold over the past 40 years, rising from around 18 million tonnes to more than 86 million tonnes by 1989. Estimates for 1990 indicate a decline to 83 million tonnes but, at the trend rate of the past 20 years, the total catch would exceed 100 million tonnes by the year 2000.
Prior to 1970, the world catch of marine fish rose at the rapid rate of 6.0 percent per year, but the collapse from 12 to 2 million metric tons in Peruvian anchoveta fishing between 1970 and 1973 reduced the total catch of all marine species and marked a major break in the growth rate. Over the ensuing two decades, global marine catch rose at only 2.3 percent per year (Fig. 1).
Institutional, environmental, socio-economic, biological and technological factors were all influencing this pattern of expansion in world fisheries during this initial decade of EEZ. For example, technological advances, including the introduction of on-board freezing and processing, enabled fishing fleets to exploit fish stocks far away from home ports. The advent of synthetic twines and the mechanization of hauling gear led to the design of bigger and more durable nets while electronic fish detection and navigational aids increased the efficiency of the deployment of both fishing vessels and gear.
Five species accounted for most of the production increase during the 1980s. The catch of Alaska pollack, Chilean jack mackerel, Peruvian anchoveta, Japanese pilchard and South American pilchard increased from 12 million tonnes in 1980 to 25 million in 1989 (Fig. 2). The Japanese and South American pilchard share with the Peruvian anchoveta the characteristic of widely fluctuating yields as a result of natural variability. These stocks are expected to decrease in the future. Indeed, Japan's catch of Japanese pilchard dropped from 4.49 million tonnes in 1988 to 3.68 tonnes in 1990.
These are also five relatively low-valued species. Alaska pollack has an average unit value of about one-third that of all other species. The average unit values of the other four species are about 10 percent of the overall average value while, together, the five species only contributed about 6 percent of total value of production in 1989. Thus the increase in the total catch of these five species makes a relatively low economic contribution to the growth in output.
Catch has also increased for higher-value species which are facing increased demand. The catch of all tuna increased fairly steadily during the past two decades, adding one million tonnes to the total annual catch between 1980 and 1989. The catch of skipjack and yellowfin tuna have increased at a rate of 5.4 percent and 4.5 percent per year, respectively, since 1970.
Skipjack stocks throughout the world are apparently abundant and have high rates of reproduction, which may allow significant increases in the global catch. Similar increases are less likely for yellowfin tuna and unlikely for the other major market species (albacore, northern and southern bluefin and bigeye). There have, however, been recent increases in the catch of albacore, particularly by Taiwan, Province of China, whose catch rose from an average level of about 60 000 tonnes during the period 1977 - 1985 to almost 140 000 tonnes in 1989. This was a result, at least in part, of the expanded use of large drift nets, a fishing technology capable of filtering great quantities of water on the high seas.
Shrimp are another group of species contributing to the increase in total marine catch. Total catch from all sources (marine and inland, capture and culture) rose from 1.1 million tonnes in 1970 to 1.7 million in 1980 and 2.4 million in 1989. The most dramatic increase occurred in China where total shrimp production rose fivefold over the two decades to reach more than 500 000 tonnes, or about 20 percent of total world output. In 1989, aquaculture accounted for about one-third of Chinese shrimp production. World production of shrimp by aquaculture in both fresh and marine water grew rapidly, reaching a total of 509 000 tonnes in 1989 (Fig. 3).
Salmon production was about 400 000 tonnes during the 1970s, reaching 600 000 tonnes in 1980 and rising to more than 1 million tonnes in 1989. This was a result of both the recovery of stocks through more effective conservation measures and production through aquaculture. Salmon production by aquaculture mainly began in Norway in 1980, with several other countries quickly following suit. Norway currently accounts for more than 25 percent of total salmon production. Prices of salmon have declined markedly in response to increased production from both capture and culture fisheries (Fig. 4).
The significant overall increase in the global marine catch during the 1980s obscures a number of features that give cause for concern. First, there is little reason to believe that global catch can continue to expand, except for increases that might occur through more effective management of stocks. The stocks that have accounted to a large extent for the recent growth are the small shoaling pelagics, such as sardines, pilchards and anchovies. These stocks are subject to wide fluctuations in biomass. Some of them are at the peak of their cycles and can be expected to decline in the future although, since others may increase to take their place, the aggregate catch is not likely to change.
Moreover, these species are mostly used for the production of fish-meal and have a low value, thus making a relatively small contribution to the global economy.
An aspect raising more concern is that of the continued overfishing of many individual stocks of fish. Although there are instances of stock rehabilitation through the adoption of conservation measures, these are relatively scarce in most areas of the world. The more general situation is one of depletion. The catch of four important species of groundfish (Atlantic cod, Cape hake, haddock, and silver hake) dropped from 5 million tonnes in 1970 to 2.6 million in 1989 (Fig. 5). Because of overfishing, there have been signficant drops in catches of Atlantic redfishes, Pacific Ocean perch, yellow croaker, atka mackerel, Atlantic herring and Atlantic mackerel.
Most shrimp stocks throughout the world have been fished beyond the point of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). In many cases, the small size of the individuals harvested is not only leading to a lower total catch but also to considerable economic losses because of the lower prices received. In addition, the shrimp trawlers often take large quantities of trash fish, frequently account for up to 90 percent of their hauls. Some of the fish taken in these hauls are juveniles of species that would be of high value if landed as adults.
The depletion of various stocks of fish has occurred in virtually all coastal states throughout the world. Indeed, as discussed below, this is an inevitable outcome unless appropriate controls are adopted.
Three types of areas attract distant-water fleets: (i) areas of upwellings where deep, cold ocean waters rise to the surface, bringing with them abundant nutrients; (ii) areas of extensive continental shelves (e.g. northeastern America); and (iii) areas where tuna stocks may be found. Most of the tropical zones (e.g. the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, Caribbean Sea) are of lesser interest to the distant- water states because of the large diversity of species and relatively small size of individual stocks. The relative importance of the various fishing areas is shown in Fig. 6.
Rich areas of upwellings which have attracted the distant-water fleets are found in the eastern central Atlantic (off northwestern Africa), the southeast Atlantic and the southeast Pacific. In the eastern central Atlantic, the catch by developing coastal states has shown a consistent increase over the two decades. However, much of this catch has been taken under joint ventures with foreign fishermen who have avoided access negotiations and costs by adopting coastal state flags.
The southeast Atlantic contains similar stocks of shoaling pelagic species in addition to large quantities of demersal stocks of Cape hake. The coastal state catch has declined over the past two decades. A large portion of this region is off the coast of Namibia which did not claim extended jurisdiction until it acquired independence in 1990. This region has been marked by considerable overfishing of the Cape hake and pilchard stocks.
Until the mid-1970s, Peru dominated the southeast Pacific region. The Chilean catch then took off, growing from 1 million to almost 7 million tonnes by 1989. The former USSR entered the area significantly in 1979.
The coastal state catch is most significant in the southeast Pacific. In the eastern central and southeast Atlantic, the coastal state catch declined in the 1970s and increased in the 1980s. The increase was only moderate, however, and to some extent a result of the transfer of flags from the developed states.
The major areas of large continental shelves of interest to the distant-water states include the northwest and southwest Atlantic and the northeast Pacific all of which experienced dramatic changes. In the northwest Atlantic, although total catch in this region has declined, the catch of the coastal states of Canada and the United States has increased since the 1970s.
In some regards, on the west coast of North America, the developments are similar to those on the east coast. To a large extent, the distant-water states have been replaced (in the catching sector) by the coastal states, particularly the United States. Here, however, there was a strong increase in the total catch during the 1980s, mostly made up of Alaska pollack. The former USSR's fleet virtually ended fishing operations by 1980, while the Japanese fleet continued into the 1980s, although with ever-decreasing catch levels. The former USSR and Japanese fishery activities remained although in a different form. The former USSR, until recently, operated joint ventures under which its processing vessels purchased fish caught by its United States partners, while the Japanese have invested in joint ventures as well as in shore processing facilities.
In the southwest Atlantic, an opposite development is taking place. In this region, the coastal states dominated the fisheries during the 1970s. However, from about the middle of that decade, distant-water states entered the area and increased their catch from a negligible amount to 1 million tonnes, amounting to over 40 percent of the region's total catch. Over two-thirds of this distant-water catch is of newly-discovered squid stocks and is taken by several distant- water states. The phenomenal increase in squid catches during the mid-1980s, levelled off in the last three years as maximum limits were reached and controls were established over the catch.
Changes have occurred in other regions as well although not generally of the same significance with regard to distribution patterns between distant-water and coastal states.
Globally, developing countries have been increasing their marine catch (since the collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fisheries in 1972) at a considerably faster rate than the developed countries (Fig. 7). The developing countries, which accounted for 27 percent of the world catch in 1950, now account for more than half the total. Unlike fisheries in the industrialized countries, their fisheries are dominated by small-scale or artisanal producers. Artisanal fisheries, typically using small boats and canoes, account for more than 25 percent of the world catch. They are the source of more than 40 percent of the fish used for human consumption.
Among the 20 countries with the largest catch during the two decades, 9 are developed and 11 are developing. Footnote 1 In each case, there are three states with significantly larger catches than the others: Peru, China and Chile; and Japan, the former USSR and the United States.
With the significant exceptions of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, the catch of the developing countries is almost entirely within their EEZs. Thailand initially fished heavily in the zones of other southeast Asian states but now does so only slightly. China, on the other hand, began fishing in the eastern central Atlantic in 1985 and in the northeast Pacific in 1986, although the amounts caught are still small.
China's catch in the northwest Pacific has grown rapidly, particularly since 1985 when its total catch rose from 3.9 million to 6.4 million tonnes. This resulted, at least to some extent, from the relaxation of domestic price controls and the consequent incentive to deploy excess fishing capacity from national waters.
The Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China take the greatest proportion of their catch in the northwest Pacific. Both, however, have increasingly extended their efforts into distant waters, reaching 20 and 25 percent, respectively, of their total marine catch.
Most of the Republic of Korea's northeast Pacific catch, which peaked in 1986 is Alaska pollack. Both states have recently been taking large quantities of squid in the southwest Atlantic and tuna in the eastern and western central Pacific.
Among the developed countries, Japan maintains the lead, but only because of the extremely large increase in its pilchard catch which currently makes up 37 percent of the country's total marine catch. Japan's catch in distant waters has shifted significantly among the different regions over the past two decades, particularly since 1980. There was an extremely large decline in catches off the Pacific coast of North America but some increases occurred in other areas of the Pacific and the southwest Atlantic.
In terms of total tonnage, the former USSR continued to be the largest distant-water fishing country through 1989. Preliminary estimates indicate a decline in its total marine catch of about one million tonnes in 1990 and most analysts expect a continuing decline (see Box 2 - The likely decline of the former USSR fleet ).
Similar patterns of decline have occurred for the East European countries. Their catches off North America declined significantly (although there were two periods of relatively high catches in the early and mid-1980s). In other regions, as in the case of the former USSR, there were large variations with significant increases in the South Atlantic and northwest Pacific and declines in the eastern central Atlantic and northeast Atlantic. The mobility of the East European fleet is also indicated in the large changes in the composition of the catch.
It is apparent that the US and Canada have taken advantage of the EEZs and significantly increased their proportion of the catches taken off their east and west coasts. On the east coast, although their share of the total rose from about 30 percent to about 40 percent each, there was only a moderate increase in absolute terms. In the Canadian part of the region, conservation controls to allow the rehabilitation of overfished stocks explain the moderate increase in catch.
On the west coast, the combined catch of the United States and Canada rose from about 20 percent of the total to more than 90 percent and there was a sixfold increase in tonnage, from 500 000 to 3 million tonnes, of which the United States accounted for about 90 percent. The United States also takes an additional one million tonnes from the western central Atlantic and smaller amounts from the east and western central Pacific.
For the United States, gains on the west coast accounted almost entirely for the doubling of its marine catch during the two decades. Virtually all of this increase occurred from 1980 onwards. Although the major gain was in Alaska pollack, an almost equivalent increase occurred in catches of various "whitefish" (cod, hake, halibut, sole).
Spain remains one of the largest distant-water fishing nations. The proportion of its total marine catch taken outside of the northeastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean remains at about 50 percent. During the 1970s, the significant declines in catches from the northwest Atlantic were made up by increases from the eastern central Atlantic. In the southeast Atlantic, large catches of Cape hakes were maintained throughout the two decades but were curtailed in 1990 and 1991 by Namibia's acquisition of independence and its extension of jurisdiction and controls over foreign fishing. This should allow the over-exploited stocks of Cape hake to recover.
In general, distant-water fishing declined during the 1970s but increased during the 1980s. Changes in catches by the major distant- water states are shown in Fig. 8. Although the Japanese non-local catch has diminished, catches by the other states either remained level or increased, particularly during the 1980s. This was achieved by significant shifts in areas of activity, i.e. moving to zones of developing coastal states where they could acquire access rights or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. Their major targets have become various species of tuna; cephalopods, particularly squid; and certain species that can be caught in large quantities at low cost.
| The likely decline of the former USSR fleet |
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Although the political breakup of the former USSR is bound
to have major consequences for fisheries, a much more significant
development for the sector is the departure from a centrally
planned economy. It is not yet clear which of the newly
independent states will acquire the fishing vessels. Although the
Russian Federation may maintain the lion's share of around 80
percent, because of its ports in Murmansk, Kaliningrad and
Vladivostok, other states have placed their flags on vessels
based in the Baltic and Black Seas. In all cases, however, it is
the change in the economic regime that will dominate developments
in the sector. Some speculation regarding its likely effects is
worthwhile because of the significance of these states' catches
for particular regions. The decision to expand the former USSR fishing fleet during the 1960s was based on a resource allocation methodology that was very different from an allocation system based on market prices. In the former USSR, policymakers compared the quantities of fish protein that could be obtained per unit of labour and capital with the quantities of protein that could be obtained from meat. The analysis concluded that the production of fish would use about half as much capital investment, one-third of the production costs and one-quarter of the labour requirements compared with those required for the production of an equivalent amount of meat. Over time, this decision process led to an increasingly uneconomical fishing sector. By 1989, estimates indicated that operating expenses were around $10 billion to $13 billion per year. The marine catch of 10 million tonnes, over half of which is composed of low-value pelagic species, would indicate revenues of perhaps $5 billion at the most. Thus, the annual operating deficit would amount to $5 billion to $8 billion, which would be considerably greater with the inclusion of capital costs. Although the fleets of many other countries are also operating with large deficits, their economies (for better or worse) can sustain high subsidies. The demand for fish as a source of animal protein is high in the former USSR. Subsidies may continue, although most likely at a greatly diminished rate. It is likely that the subsidies will go to the smaller vessels operating in relatively near shore waters and that the costly, high fuel-consuming distant-water vessels will largely disappear. Since there are few opportunities to increase catches in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Mediterranean, any future effort will probably focus on the northern part of the North Sea and the northwest Pacific. Some distant-water fishing may continue to take place through joint ventures with developing countries. A large part of the decline is likely to take place in three areas: the east central and southeast Atlantic and the southeast Pacific, where the USSR catch in 1989 amounted to about 3 million tonnes. In the eastern central Atlantic, the coastal states (particularly Morocco) should benefit to some extent by the diminution of the former USSR fleet. Since most of the stocks are currently fully exploited, the gains would come in the form of increased catches per unit of effort. Any attempts by the coastal states to expand their capacity in order to replace that of the former USSR, should proceed with extreme caution in view of the low prices of the species and wide variability in size of the stocks. Thus, in the southeast Atlantic, the stocks of horse mackerel are in relatively good shape but the replacement of the former USSR fleet by domestic vessels is likely to be a slow process because of market constraints. Increases by the Republic of South Africa and, eventually, Namibia are possible. For the southeast Pacific, Chile has rapidly expanded its catch of the jack mackerel and could probably replace the former USSR catch in the next few years.
Overall, assuming a 75 percent decline in the former USSR
catch in distant-water areas, a total drop in the catch from 10
million to 7 million tonnes could be expected. Pressures to
increase catch in local waters will be intense but the
opportunities to do so, particularly for Alaska pollack, are
limited. Therefore a significant decline in the availability of
animal protein to the former USSR and other countries,
particularly in West Africa, is likely to occur. The likely
increase in prices for small pelagic species could induce a more
rapid development of coastal fisheries in West Africa.
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Although the extension of national jurisdiction was critically important for all coastal states in that it provided them with the exclusive right to manage the resources within their zones, it had a limited effect on the distribution of the seas' wealth because of the relatively few countries affected. Although some observers considered that the extension of jurisdiction would lead to a major redistribution of the seas' wealth in fisheries, the results have been mixed. Fishery resources are of considerable local importance to a large number of countries, but more than 80 percent of the global catch is taken by 20 countries (Fig. 9). In 1989, two states alone (Japan and the USSR) took 25 percent of the total marine catch; the next four countries took 30 percent; and the following 14 another 25 percent. The remaining coastal states shared in less than 20 percent of the total marine catch.
In the Special Chapter of the State of Food and Agriculture 1980 it was noted that potential gains would accrue to the relatively few states whose zones contained large or valuable resources that attracted the vessels of the distant-water fleets; and to a number of coastal states whose zones contain tuna stocks (mostly the South Pacific island states). Among the dozen coastal states that stood to gain large resources by the extension of jurisdiction the United States emerged as the single largest gainer (although all coastal states achieved gains in terms of management authority). Furthermore, for those states that have acquired jurisdiction over large fish stocks, the gains varied greatly according to the value of the species.
Whatever the impact of the establishment of EEZs, however, changes in the distribution of the sea's wealth in fisheries cannot be considered solely in terms of quantities of catch. As discussed below, the country's benefits or losses should be measured in terms of the net profit to the national economy.
For several developing countries, however, the extension of jurisdiction did represent significant gains in terms of economic revenues and other benefits extracted from the distant-water states. For instance, under an agreement with the EEC, Morocco received about $ 80 million per year for three years for allowing Spanish vessels to fish in its EEZ. Footnote 2 Payments to African countries for 1991 include $20 million to Senegal, $12.9 million to Mauritania and $12 million to Angola. The South Pacific states have received $60 million from the United States to allow that country's vessels to fish for tuna within the region for a five-year period. However, the great majority of developing countries have not received financial payments for access to their EEZs since the resources within their zones have been of little interest to the distant-water states.
Similar to two decades ago, only a few countries are currently engaged in extensive distant-water fishing. In 1970, six states--the USSR, Japan, Spain, Poland, Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany--took over 85 percent of the total catch by states in FAO statistical areas outside their own. Footnote 3 In 1989, the six largest distant-water fishing states took almost 90 percent of the total non-local catch. They were the same states, except that the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China replaced Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany. The USSR, Japan and Spain alone accounted for three-fourths of the total in both periods. Total non- local catch by all states rose from 7.5 to 9 million tonnes from 1970 to 1990, but dropped as a percentage of global marine catch from 13 to 11 percent. There have been, however, mixed effects among the major states and a generalized increase in the costs of distant-water fishing.
For Japan, retrenchment of distant-water fishing began to take place prior to the extension of jurisdiction, primarily in response to rising labour and fuel costs.Instead, joint ventures were formed with the processing sectors of other countries. In addition, as a result of extensions in jurisidction, the Japanese have reduced the numbers of vessels authorized to fish in order to maintain catches per vessel. In the North Pacific, for example, the number of large mother ships and trawlers dropped from about 260 to 100 between 1983 and 1987 while catch per vessel rose from 4 600 to more than 9 000 tonnes in order to allow for increased operational costs. Footnote 4
For the USSR, Poland and other East European countries, the extensions meant the loss of free access to a large quantity of stocks. This forced these countries either to negotiate financial arrangements with coastal states or to move to under-exploited stocks on the high seas, such as Chilean jack mackerel and Antarctic krill. While the extension of jurisdiction added to their fishing costs, the major problem they now face is a big reduction in financial resources to pay the subsidies that were necessary to support their distant- water operations. Romania has scrapped 20 of its 46 distant-water trawlers while Bulgaria has scrapped 5 out of 15.
The distant-water catches of Spain and France have not changed significantly. Spain's catch in non-local areas in 1989 was only 15 percent less than that of 1970. The catch by French vessels dropped during the 1970s but increased during the 1980s, the net result being an overall increase of 19 percent for the two decades. A large part of this increase was a result of the expansion in tuna catch in the western Indian Ocean. For both of these countries, the costs of acquiring access to foreign (mostly African) zones are, to a large extent, borne by the EEC which negotiates agreements on their behalf. Among the other European states, Italy's non-local catches did not change significantly during the two decades, while those of both the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway declined sharply from about 200 000 tonnes to about 10 000 tonnes, and those of Portugal were halved from 200 000 to 100 000 tonnes.
With its small coastline, the Federal Republic of Germany, was particularly hard hit by the extension of jurisdiction. Domestic production as a share of domestic consumption fell from 77 percent in 1970 to 43 percent in 1980 and to 28 percent in 1989. The tonnage of deep sea vessels with freezing and processing facilities fell from 117 000 Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) in 1970 to only 21 000 GRT in 1990. This major structural adjustment was accomplished with government support for the retirement of vessels.
Losses in quantitative terms are not necessarily equivalent to losses in economic terms, not only because of differences in value of the species harvested but also because the open access condition that previously existed induced wasteful fishing practices. Where stocks have been fully fished, controls by coastal states that reduce the number of foreign fishing vessels can lead to increased average catches for those vessels that are allowed to remain in the fishery. For example, the cephalopod (squid, cuttlefish and octopus) fishery off Morocco has been so heavily overfished that a reduction in the number of vessels (and total costs) would allow the rehabilitation of stocks and, ultimately, higher total catches as well as revenues. This would lead to considerably higher catches per vessel that remained in the fishery. At the same time, an estimate $ 250 million per year in surplus profits could be extracted by Morocco in the form of fishing fees. Footnote 5 In essence, it is in the interest of both the coastal states and distant-water fishing fleets to reduce excess fishing capacity and thereby achieve greater economic efficiency.
The coastal states could levy user fees directly on the foreign vessel owners to obtain greater economic benefits. However, when the costs of access are not borne by the fishermen, but are paid by their governments (e.g. the EEC and the United States), distant-water fishermen have no incentive to discontinue overfishing the coastal state's stocks. If a coastal state negotiates access agreements that include the authorization of numbers of vessels, those who acquire licenses may receive higher catches per unit and obtain higher profits.
Much of the existing European distant-water fleet is the product of high subsidies together with increasing restrictions on overfished stocks in the domestic European waters. This has resulted in surplus fishing capacity and pressure for access to foreign zones. The problems facing these fleets may, therefore, result as much or, more, from the failure to achieve rational fisheries management than to the extension of national jurisdiction.
As referred to above, an assessment of the state of economic health of the industry cannot be confined to changes in physical outputs but might include an evaluation of costs and revenues. Such an evaluation is difficult to do, however, because of data limitations (see Box 3 - Fisheries data ). Nevertheless, the general perception that the industry is incurring massive deficits on a global basis underscores the need to begin attempts to quantify the scale of the problem.
| Fisheries data |
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Collecting fisheries data is extraordinarily difficult.
Several special characteristics distinguish the task from that of
collecting data on other natural resource industries. Fish in the
sea are not readily countable both because of the opacity of the
medium and their tendency to move. Another basic problem is the sheer number of species and countries involved. FAO currently collects data on 995 species from 227 countries and administrative or political entities (including small islands such as Christmas and Norfolk Islands). Data are collected for catches in 30 statistical regions (inland and marine). The information on catches is provided to FAO by individual countries, many of which are unable to devote the resources necessary to perform the task adequately. A large portion of many developing countries' catches is landed on isolated beaches along extensive coastlines. The coastline of the state of Kerala in India is only 600 km long (about 8 percent of the total Indian seaboard) but has 220 recognized landing places. Indonesia stretches over a distance of some 5 000 km and has more than 13 000 islands. In addition to the difficulties of collecting catch data, there are also problems concerning the falsification of data, mostly, though not entirely, by fishermen of developed countries. Fishing operations often take place far out to sea, where they are not readily observable. Certain management measures, particularly those limiting the quantities of catch, induce fishermen to underreport their catch or take other measures to avoid compliance. The enforcement of such measures is extremely difficult. There are other situations where overreporting of catches has been known to take place in attempts to increase the importance of fisheries to the national economy. Aside from the simple measuring of quantities of catch, there are also considerable difficulties in estimating revenues. Individual species vary widely in value, ranging from species used for fishmeal, at less than US $100 per tonne, to luxury species such as lobsters, at more than $10 000, or bluefin tuna for sashimi at $20 000 per tonne. Furthermore, for any particular species, prices vary with regard to size, quality, points of landing, season and even time of landing during the day. Many of these variations are a result of the high degree of perishability of most fish species. Accurate information on fish prices at points of landing is rare. It is equally difficult to obtain accurate information on fishing costs. Simply in terms of numbers of fishing units, the problems are difficult. For example, in the state of Kerala, a detailed survey carried out in the early 1980s estimated about 30 000 fishing craft, mostly non-mechanized types, and about 3 000 mechanized gillnetters and trawlers. These included 22 different combinations of vessels and gear. In addition to the large numbers involved, there are problems in obtaining costs of the various inputs. Estimates of capital costs are obscured by the informal credit markets in many developing countries and the high and diverse kinds of subsidies in developed countries. Labour costs are difficult to estimate because most fishermen are paid through a system under which total catch is divided into shares for the boat, the gear, operating costs and for crew members according to their position. The costs of fishing gear, supplies, insurance, fuel and maintenance can be obtained for the large scale vessels of developed countries, but are not readily available in most developing countries. FAO, with the help of regional fisheries bodies, has made a considerable contribution in developing standardized reporting forms and providing these to states, often with training programmes. The Organization is the sole repository of information on global fisheries. However, its efforts have been primarily (though not entirely) focused on quantities of catch and only recently has it attempted to expand the acquisition of data on costs and revenues, which are vital for improving fisheries management. FAO, however, must rely on individual states to provide the necessary data. Fisheries cost and price information is not a high priority for most states, at present, largely because the value of such information is not readily evident to administrators. In the absence of controls over access, very little can be done to improve the contribution of fisheries to national economies while the resources themselves have no marketable value. The demand for economic information is relatively low compared with the costs of supplying it. However, where access controls are in place, demand increases. For example, in the northern Australian prawn fishery, managed by a limited entry programme, the fishermen themselves pay for information that tells them when to move from one area to another in order to focus their efforts on the larger and higher-priced prawns. As in the case of catch data, FAO can play a useful role in providing advice and training on the collection of economic data. This, together with advice and training on improved fisheries management practices, will lead to greatly improved fisheries data. Current difficulties in the acquisition of fisheries
information, indicate that the estimates of catches, values and costs
contained in this chapter must be considered as imprecise. However,
for some of the more important points made, the estimates
may be relatively reliable since they relate to a few countries
taking a large percentage of the total production and value and
involve a small number of species. Furthermore, although absolute
figures may be rough estimates, the relative values and overall
trends are considered satisfactory for evaluating major issues.
|
Over the past several years, FAO has requested fishing countries to provide information on the size of their fishing fleets. Footnote 6 Most developed countries with large fishing fleets provide data showing the numbers of vessels by size class and by gear type. For these countries, the estimates are believed to be relatively accurate for vessels over 100 (GRT) in size, but much less so for smaller craft. For many developing countries, the task of acquiring the information is even more difficult and the estimates are less certain. Since there are a few significant gaps in the provision of information by developed countries (e.g. from the United States) as well as the general deficiencies in the data from developing countries, the totals are considered to underestimate the full fishing capacity. Therefore, the calculations of costs are likely to be quite conservative.
IV. Appendix 1 provides detailed information outlining how costs have been calculated for the construction of fishing vessels, replacement costs of the global fishing fleet, fuel costs, maintenance and repairs, insurance, supplies and gear, labour and capital.
The total annual operating costs of the global fishing fleet for 1989 is $92.2 billion, without including returns to capital or allowances for debt servicing. Annual routine maintenance is estimated to be $30 billion; insurance is $7 billion; supplies and gear $18.5 billion; and fuel costs $14 billion. IV. Appendix 1 provides two estimates for annual labour costs with a lower estimate of $22.7 billion.
Based on 1989 gross revenue of around $70 billion (See Table 1), the annual operating deficit is estimated to be approximately $22 billion without considering the cost of capital.
While some debt servicing costs can be at preferentially low rates, particularly those provided through international finance institutions and bilateral assistance, in most cases the debt servicing charges are at least equal to commercial rates and have been high. With a replacement value of $320 billion, the return to capital would at least have to equal opportunity costs, which, since there are limited opportunities for converting fishing vessels to other uses, may be lower than other maritime practices and can be set at 10 percent for this exercise. The resulting costs for the fleet would increase by $32 billion for a deficit of about $54 billion. In general, an allocation of 17 percent of revenues is the minimum required to cover debt servicing, depreciation and profit margins.
Estimates of the gross revenues received by fishermen are also difficult to make. On the basis of scattered information, FAO has derived rough indicators of the average unit values in 1989 for the major species and species groups (Table 1). Where possible, estimates for individual species caught in large quantities are provided and they are believed to be relatively reliable (e.g. Atlantic cod, Alaska pollack, Norway pout, sandeel, capelin, Japanese pilchard). For several of the other groups, there is a degree of uniformity in the unit value of the dominant component species, (shrimp; salmon; tuna; squid, cuttlefish and octopus; lobster; and clams and other molluscs). Other groups, however, contain numerous species for which there are extreme differences in price (redfish, jack and mullet, mackerel). In these cases, an attempt has been made to provide a weighted average unit value.
An additional caution needs to be expressed. The estimates are based on 1989 information. Since prices vary from year to year, the degree to which they represent the present situation may be questioned. It is known, for example, that prices of salmon have declined significantly in the past two years because of the large culture production and abundant catches in the North Pacific. For the most part, however, the estimates presented are believed to be a reflection of relative values.
Given these words of warning, it is still possible to make a general point: a relatively few species account for a large proportion of the total value of the marine fisheries catch.
Table 2 shows that eight species and uniform species groups make up almost 50 percent of the total value. Moreover, with the exception of Alaska pollack, all of these have high unit values: more than $1 000 per tonne. These species are also the ones for which there is likely to be the largest amount of economic over-fishing, as discussed in the section fisheries management, below.
It is noteworthy that, on a global basis, the fishing industry shows evidence of high concentration. A few countries account for the greatest amount of catch and incur the largest proportion of costs while a few species make up the largest amount of value. There is no evidence, however, of a general concurrence of these concentrations. The vessels of the former USSR, for example, contributed greatly to the total fishing costs and harvested a large share of the total world catch, but their catch was mostly made up of low valued species (including Alaska pollack). Furthermore, the shrimp which is the most valued species group, are caught by a large number of countries, only a few of which have industrial fleets.
A comparison of estimated gross revenues of marine catch with the estimated costs of the global fishing fleet produces a remarkable conclusion. These calculations indicate that the annual operating costs of the global marine fishing fleet in 1989 were in the order of $22 billion greater than the total revenues, with no account being taken of capital costs. Although the calculations are tentative, they still suggest that global marine fisheries may be incurring very significant losses.
There are several reasons why this situation may be possible. One is the condition of open access which still persists on the high seas and, in most states, for the domestic fleets within national economic zones. Where this condition exists, fleet size (and capital investment) will tend to be greater than that required to take optimum yields from the stocks. Open access provides an incentive to over- capitalize (see Box 4 - The economic consequences of open access ).
Although with the extensions of limits foreign fishermen no longer have free and open access, overcapitalization may still be significant because access fees are generally paid by governments, rather than by the fishermen. Fishermen therefore have no incentive to reduce their fleets.
Overcapitalization is exacerbated by the ease of entry into fisheries and the difficulties of exit. When prices rise or stocks are abundant, new vessels are built. But when prices or yields drop and there are no alternative opportunities for the employment of the vessels, they remain in the fisheries, as long as they are able to cover their direct operating costs. When the owners can no longer cover such costs, they often sell their vessels to fishermen in other fisheries or in other countries. Footnote 7 The scrapping of fishing vessels tends to be delayed well beyond the time of scrapping in most other maritime industries; that is generally not until refit costs approach the costs of a new vessel. Footnote 8
This situation may be particularly significant for the large vessels of many distant-water fleets. These fleets have been sufficiently mobile to move from one ocean region to another as the abundance of the stocks has changed because of overfishing or natural variations. Yet such alternative opportunities for the employment of the fleets have become increasingly restricted as overfishing has become more pervasive.
Another reason for the large deficit is that the fishing industry, is heavily subsidized in many countries. It has already been noted that massive subsidies supported the former USSR fleet as well as fleets of East European countries. These subsidies account for only a portion of the total deficit when capital costs are included, however. In Japan, the Japan Fisheries Association noted that "The current credit balance extended to fisheries from both the commercial and government sectors is about $19 billion." Footnote 9 It also stated that "in order to support business entities in financial difficulties, the government financing system will assume their liabilities. The amount of liability taken over by the government has been substantial in recent years due to the severe economic status of the fisheries industry."
EEC fisheries also receive substantial support. Between 1983 and 1990, EEC support rose from $80 million to $580 million, about 20 percent of which was for the construction of new vessels and modernization of old ones (Fig. 10). This amount does not include substantial subsidies provided by the national governments. Elsewhere in Europe, Norway also provides significant fisheries support which amounted to about $150 million per year during the second half of the 1980s. Footnote 10
Fisheries are directly or indirectly subsidized in a variety of ways. Traditional kinds of subsidy are: import restrictions and tariffs (including limits on landings of foreign vessels), export support, price control systems, fuel subsidies; and low cost loans or outright grants for the construction of vessels or the purchase of gear, the construction of ports, marketing facilities and other infrastructure.
In addition, there are fishery-specific subsidies such as the payments made by governments to coastal states for access to their zones and the waiving of payments by domestic fishermen for access to their national zones. Free access to a natural resource constitutes a subsidy to the users since no payments are being made for the resource. Under a system of controlled access, economic rents are captured by the government through taxes or license fees.
The reasons for granting such subsidies are as manifold as the types of support schemes. In many cases financial help is given to the fishing sector - and less frequently to the post-harvest sector - for social reasons, for example to sustain employment in sometimes sparsely inhabited coastal districts. Subsidies might also be given for general policy reasons since the competing agricultural sector enjoys similar support on a large scale. In other cases, particularly in the former centralized economies in Eastern Europe, food policies were designed to ensure an adequate supply of fish to the population, and fish was calculated to be cheaper than other animal protein if produced domestically. Even larger vertically integrated corporate enterprises, whether privately- or state-owned, have often accepted losses in the fishing sector, because such losses were compensated by profits in processing and marketing operations.
The amounts of these subsidies (or dissipated economic rents) are not reflected in the above calculations on global costs and revenues. That they are extraordinarily large is indicated in the discussion below with regard to the cephalopod fishery off Morocco and the groundfish fishery off New England.
Such massive recourse to subsidies arises from governments' efforts to preserve employment opportunities in the ship building, as well as the fishing industries and may be a response to the general economic plight of fisheries. However, as the opportunities for an increased catch from fishery resources have declined considerably, a continuation of the high subsidies can only lead to greater and greater economic distress as well as further depletion of stocks.
There is also the assumption that significant quantities of fish are not reported to governments, either as a result of infrastructure weaknesses in the administration of fisheries, with vessels under- reporting their catches in order to circumvent management measures, or as a result of "on the grounds cash sales". Footnote 11
| The economic consequences of open access |
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The economic theory of common property natural resources explains why an uncontrolled fishery tends to attract excessive amounts of capital and labour and why it may be fished beyond the point of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), a biologically determined quantity. At different levels of fishing effort (numbers of vessels or fishermen) maintained over the long term, a particular stock of fish will produce different levels of sustainable yields (Diagram 1). The yields increase in response to greater amounts of fishing effort up to the point of msy. For some stocks fishing beyond that point depletes the stock so that subsequent yields are lower than the maximum, although the fishing effort has increased. For other stocks, depletion may not occur so rapidly and the msy can be achieved over a wide range of fishing effort. However, excessive amounts of capital and labour will still be employed. The total catch curve can also represent total revenues to the fishery on the assumption that varying sizes of catch do not affect average prices received. The total cost curve is shown as a straight line based on the simplified assumption that every additional unit of effort has equal costs. With open access, the fishery reaches equilibrium when total costs and total revenues are equal (at point E). At any amount of fishing effort below that point, average revenues are greater than average costs, thereby attracting other fishermen into the fishery. The principle of the economic efficiency suggests that the fishery operate at the point of maximum net revenue (MNR), where the cost of the additional unit of effort is equal to the additional revenue it produces. That is where marginal costs and marginal revenues are equal. With the extension of jurisdiction, many stocks now come under the sole ownership of a single country. That country, if it wishes, can control the amount of fishing effort through various techniques. Such controls could be used to increase the earnings per fisherman by reducing the number of fishermen. The fact that earnings per fisherman in a fully utilized fishery can be increased over the long term only by reducing or limiting the number of fishermen constitutes the essential dilemma facing fishery administrators. In many situations, policymakers attempt to increase earnings per fisherman without limiting entry into the fisheries. They may do this by providing price supports or other devices that increase the revenue per unit of fishing effort, thereby raising the total revenue curve as shown in Diagram 2. In the short term, subsidies produce additional profits for the fishermen, attract more fishermen into the fishery, and raise total costs until they reach total revenues again. Average earnings per fisherman decline to their former level but more fishermen are employed (at point A' instead of point A). In some cases, the subsidy may also lead to greater depletion of the stock. It can be noted that a rise in prices, through increased demand, also has the same result. Over a 30 year period in the Alaska salmon fishery, rising prices made it economically feasible for twice as many fishermen to be employed catching half as many fish. An increase in fuel costs clearly has a negative effect on fisheries but the result, after a period of adjustment, tends to be a drop in employment in the fishery rather than a decrease in average earnings. The increase in costs forces some of the fishermen out of the fishery but as they leave, those remaining increase their average catches and revenues because of reduced competition. The new equilibrium (point E' in Diagram 3) comes with fewer fishermen (at A' instead of A) receiving the same average net earnings as they did before. If the stock is depleted the higher fuel costs could actually lead to higher total catches by removing some of the excessive fishing pressure. Thus, countries' attempts to protect their fishermen in fully utilized fisheries by subsidizing fuel often serve to maintain employment levels and preserve the excess capacity already in the fishery, as well as supporting high levels of fuel consumption. The introduction of fuel-saving devices and techniques may have the same consequences. Cost reductions and increased profits attract more fishermen and thus increase the use of fuel. Where fisheries are already fully utilized, the most effective technique for reducing fuel consumption is through a reduction in the number of fishing vessels. In other cases, the cost may be so high (or the prices so low) that the equilibrium point occurs before the point of MSY. Although total levels of catch could increase, a reduction in fishing effort would still be desirable in order to achieve increased net revenues from the fishery. The diagrams represent typical stylized fisheries but not, of course, all fisheries. In some cases, a fishery may be just developing so that there are opportunities to increase total catches and total revenues at greater rates than those of the increases in total effort and total cost. Many such opportunities are occurring where coastal states can replace foreign fishing effort by developing their own domestic capacity. But even in these cases, the growth in domestic fishing effort should be promoted with restraint so that excess capacity is avoided. These economic principles have been tested in numerous empirical studies. One example is the yellowtail flounder fishery in the United States where it was found that the net revenue to the fleet could increase from zero to more than $6 million per year by removing 87 to 132 fishing vessels that were fishing¹. However, these principles are based on simplified assumptions that do not accommodate the high degree of complexity existing in most fisheries. Fishermen generally take several different species of fish either simultaneously or at different periods during a season. The species may be interrelated so that the yields of all cannot be maximized at the same time. Yields may also fluctuate widely and, in some cases, may grow or decline in response to shifts in environmental conditions. In addition, economic factors may vary widely over time, as well as among fishermen using different techniques and gear for the same stock. However, although these various elements may obscure or change the timing and significance of the consequences, they do not prevent them from occurring where the condition of open access is left uncontrolled. Where a coastal state has complete control over a fully utilized stock of value to foreigners but has no interest in developing its own fishing capacity, it can prevent excess effort by levying taxes on foreign fishermen. These taxes deter some foreigners from fishing but those who pay receive greater catches because of the reduced competition. Where the coastal state has exclusive control over the resource and a fully developed capacity to harvest the stocks, it may have to choose between the alternative objectives of maximizing employment opportunities or maximizing incomes. |
Trends in the real prices of fish are critically important for evaluating the significance of economic scarcity of the resources. However, price information on fisheries remains difficult to acquire and, as a result, there are very few consistent, long-term documents on the movement of fish prices. Estimates of prices received by fishermen have been derived for a few countries (Fig. 11). For these, the real prices of fish generally rose very rapidly during the 1970s: by 80 percent for the United States and Canada and by 60 percent for the United Kingdom. Significant drops occurred in the early 1980s, primarily as a result of large increases in catches, and sharp declines in prices, of cod and haddock during that period. Real prices of all fish species increased again in these countries in the latter part of the 1980s. Overall, the long-term trend is upward. From the base year of 1971, real prices in 1988 were 20 percent higher in Japan, 35 percent higher in the United Kingdom and 75 percent higher in the United States.
Similar documentation is not readily available for other countries. However, the information that is available on prices of individual fish species generally indicates that they are rising more rapidly than prices of other food and non-food products, as well as the costs of fishing inputs. This is to be expected in view of the supply limits of wild fish stocks and the continued increase in demand. Typically, as the yield from a particular species of fish reaches its maximum, prices increase. This induces consumers to substitute other, less known and lower priced species which, in turn, become fished at their maximum levels. Prices continue to increase until reaching levels commensurate with other substitutable products.
To a large extent, the rapid increase in real fish prices in the 1970s and previous years reflected the fact that fish prices were extremely low relative to prices for other sources of animal protein. However, the gap in relative prices is closing and continued increases, particularly for some of the higher valued fish species, may be restrained. For example, increases in the prices of tuna are constrained because of competition in the marketplace with chicken meat.
Other developments are also affecting the movement of fish prices. As noted above, the culture of certain species is producing sufficiently large quantities to affect the markets. In the case of salmon, real prices fell by more than 50 percent between 1988 and 1990 in the United States market. The drop in 1991 was even greater, although it was in response to an abundance of supply from wild stocks. Shrimp prices are also falling as a result of large amounts of cultivation. Several other species are currently being cultivated (e.g. carp and catfish in inland waters; oysters, clams, mussels and other shellfish) while still more are likely to be cultivated in the future. However, the total quantities from aquaculture are still small compared with the global demand for fish.
A different kind of development is the processing of low valued fish into products that substitute for high valued ones. Restructured protein, largely from Alaska pollack, is being formed into products that resemble crab meat.
Trade in fisheries has been characterized by buoyancy during the past decades, more particularly during the 1970s. The value of world trade has expanded at an annual rate of about 18 percent during the 1970s and nearly 10 percent during the 1980s. The expansion in exports by developing countries exceeded that of developed countries throughout the past two decades. On the other hand, the slowdown in import growth during the 1980s was significantly more pronounced for developing countries (Table 3 ).
The developed countries have accounted for a very high and constant share of total world imports during the past decades (88 percent of total value in 1970 and 86 percent in 1989). There have, however, been some major shifts among developed countries. Japan's share of the value of total imports rose from 8 to 28 percent, reflecting the decline in its own catch of food fish. The most significant relative drop occurred in the United States (from 25 to 16 percent) reflecting the gains through the extension of jurisdiction and its increased catch on the west coast. While the United States remains a major importer, the EEC is the largest importing region, although its imports include intra-EEC trade.
In the case of Japan, half of the imports in 1989 came from four groups of high-valued species: shrimp, tuna, squid and salmon. In the United States, shrimp make up the largest proportion of imports (29 percent in 1989). In addition, 20 percent is from frozen fish fillets and more than 10 percent from tuna. Between 1980 and 1989 there was a decline of 35 percent in imports of frozen tuna and a five-fold increase in the imports of canned tuna, marking a major shift away from domestic processing, largely to processing in Thailand.
Significant shifts in market share have also occurred on the side of exports. Thailand contributed about 6 percent to the total value of exports in 1989 compared with less than 1 percent in 1970. Shares by the Republic of Korea and the Taiwan, Province of China, also rose significantly, from negligible amounts in 1970 to 5 percent each in 1989. Other changes among exporting countries are the declines in contributions from Peru, Norway and Japan and the increase in that of the United States.
The increase by the United States was almost entirely the result of acquiring jurisdiction over Alaska pollack resources as well as the development of joint venture operations under which United States flag vessels sold their catch over the side to foreign processing vessels. These sales, counted as exports, rose from 400,000 tonnes in 1983 to almost 1.5 million tonnes in 1987 before dropping to less than 400 000 tonnes in 1990 as domestic processing took over.
Overall, the developing countries increased their share of exports between 1970 and 1989 from 32 percent to 47 percent of the total, with major relative increases by China and Chile and Thailand (Fig. 12). Thailand's exports rose from 2 to 13 percent of the total value of developing countries' exports partly because of a dramatic increase in its exports of canned tuna, which rose from 5 000 tonnes in 1981 to more than 225 000 tonnes in 1989. Most of this increase resulted from the processing of imported frozen tuna. Thailand also increased exports of frozen shrimp, mostly produced by culture, by almost four times over the same period. At the same time, Thailand's exports of fish meal declined by more than two-thirds as they were diverted to use in domestic shrimp culture.
China dramatically increased its exports of frozen shrimp, from 22 000 tonnes in 1985 to 120 000 in 1989, which accounted for over half the total value of its fish exports in the latter year. For Chile, the increase came mostly in the export of fishmeal. Although the Peruvian share of developing countries' exports fell from 35 percent in 1970 to 3 percent in 1989 (as a result of the collapse of the anchoveta fishery), together with Chile, Peru accounted for about two-thirds of the total quantity of fish meal exports in 1989.
In addition to the developments taking place in fishing activities and marketing, there have been several other developments of significance for the sector. These include changes in the law of the sea, in international arrangements for fisheries and in the marine environment.
After more than a decade of discussions, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature at the end of 1982. When it was closed for signature at the end of 1984, 159 states had signed it. Among the few members of the United Nations that did not sign the Convention are the United States, the United Kingdom and the former Federal Republic of Germany. As of 31 March 1992 51 states had ratified the Convention, 9 short of the 60 required for the Convention to enter into force. Although the Convention has not yet come into force, many of the provisions relating to fisheries have been adopted unilaterally and can be said to be part of customary international law.
Most important is the extension of national jurisdiction, as mentioned earlier. This occurred during the 1970s through claims to EEZs or to Exclusive Fishing Zones. These claims are generally to 200 nautical miles from shore but in many cases are more narrowly limited because of the proximity of adjacent states. The great majority of these claims were made in 1977 and 1978, when more than 60 states announced their claims.
The generalized extension of jurisdiction has had several effects.Most important has been the provision to coastal states of the authority necessary for effective management of their resources. Even though, at present, only a relatively few states (Australia, New Zealand, Namibia) have used that authority to exercise controls over access to the resources by domestic fishermen, there is an opportunity to do so that did not really exist under the era of freedom of the seas.
A second effect has been the redistribution of the seas' wealth in fisheries. This effect has been of major importance for only about a dozen states.
Adjustments in multilateral arrangements for the management of fisheries have also occurred as a result of jurisdiction extension. During the period of narrow limits of jurisdiction, many regional fishery bodies were created for various purposes, including the acquisition of data; coordination of research; sharing of information; and recommendation of conservation and management measures. In most cases, the bodies included both coastal states and non-coastal states with an interest in the region. They were generally successful, at least initially, in improving the collection of data on catches in sharing information. They provided a general forum for the discussion of issues but were never particularly effective in resolving problems. With a few exceptions they had only limited success in preventing the depletion of stocks and no success in preventing economically excessive fishing efforts.
During the 1970s, as jurisdiction was extended, some regional fishery bodies were abolished. Others changed their functions and methods of operation and new bodies emerged to replace old ones. In general, the FAO bodies continue to operate, although with severely diminished funding in most regions. These bodies attempt to provide fora for the exchange of information and guidance for technical assistance projects.
Non-FAO bodies that have been abolished as a consequence of extended national jurisdiction include the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and the International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF). New bodies which have arisen to replace those abolished or to deal with new situations include the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). Since 1980, other international bodies have been created including the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).
This body is instructive in several ways. Its superior body, the South Pacific Forum, was created by the South Pacific Islands in order to provide a regional organization with membership restricted to countries of the region unlike the South Pacific Commission whose members include non-local states. The South Pacific Forum created the FFA to facilitate fisheries management, particularly the management of the tuna species that migrate through the extensive EEZs of its members and to provide support to its members in the implementation of management measures.
The FFA has operated relatively effectively in coordinating the negotiations of its member states with the foreign countries whose vessels wish to gain access to the region and also in establishing minimum terms and conditions. It has also established a regional register for fishing vessels. Through these measures, the agency has been able to increase the revenues extracted from foreign fishermen and reduce the costs of surveillance. It is noteworthy that a recent agreement between the Pacific island nations and the United States stipulated that the payment of fees by the United States should cover the total area of the agreement including high sea areas surrounded by the EEZs of the island states. Certain special circumstances have facilitated the work of the FFA. The vast region falls largely within the extended zones of its members who are mostly small states with only limited capacity for tuna fishing and who consequently have much to gain by coordinating their controls over foreign fishermen. Although these conditions do not exist to the same degree elsewhere, some of FFA's approaches might be adopted elsewhere. Eastern tropical Pacific countries, for example, are currently considering the idea of a regional register for foreign vessels.
Generally, the trend over the past two decades has been to increase the strength of coastal states within regional arrangements and to decrease the role of the non-regional states, although attempts to stem this trend are still being made by distant-water fishing countries. Beyond this, it is difficult to discern any generalized developments largely because of the disparities among different regions' situations. There is, however, a general question being raised that may have significant implications for future regional fisheries bodies; that is the degree to which they will acquire authority to govern the use of resources beyond the 200 mile limit. This issue is being raised not only with regard to the high sea enclaves in the South Pacific but also with regard to the "doughnut hole" in the Bering Sea; the Grand Banks in the northwest Atlantic; and the use of drift nets on high sea areas in the Pacific.
By far the most significant environmental change related to fisheries is the overfishing of stocks. It was estimated more than 20 years ago that an additional 20 million tonnes of catch could be achieved by rehabilitating overfished stocks. Although there are a few instances where rehabilitation has occurred, such gains have been more than counterbalanced by increased depletion of other stocks.
With limited supplies and rising demand, there is an increase in the pressure on fish. Where there are no controls over access to the stocks, individual fishermen have the incentive to intercept stocks at earlier stages in their life cycles which generally occur close to shore and when fish are smaller. Furthermore, the gear used in this competitive race is generally less selective and takes greater quantities of by-catch.
It has been shown above that the 1989 marine catch of 85 million tonnes had a gross value at the fisherman's level of about $70 billion dollars. If management measures are implemented to allow stock rehabilitation, the 20 million tonnes of increased catch that could eventually occur would add more than $16 billion to the gross revenue, ceteris paribus. This estimated foregone loss, however, is only a portion of the economic waste in global fisheries since total world catch could be taken with considerably lower amounts of fishing effort and considerably lower total costs.
Depletion of stocks occurs not only because of overfishing of target stocks but also because of the large by-catches of other species. With a few minor exceptions (e.g. harpoons) all types of fishing gear take other species in addition to those intended. The amounts and kinds of by-catch vary with the kinds of gear. Bottom trawls (particularly for shrimp but also for groundfish in general in coastal areas) are perhaps the most in need of improvement for environmental reasons. In the tropical waters of developing countries, the shrimp taken in trawls may be only 10 to 20 percent of the total haul, with the rest made up of other aquatic species. Most of this is trash fish which may be thrown overboard or sold for fishmeal, for processing into fish paste or as feed for aquaculture operations. Some is sold to low-income consumers. Much of this by- catch is made up of juveniles of species which could be sold at high prices as adults.
Increased intensity in shrimp trawling in the past two decades has led to increases in the proportion of by-catch. Although real prices of shrimp have probably declined in the past two or three years, because of increased production from aquaculture, this has not necessarily led to decreased intensity in trawling since there has been a rise in demand for trash fish for use as feed in aquaculture. In fact, in some countries, shrimp farmers are now investing in trawls with small mesh nets to target trash fish. This is considered a form of "biomass fishing."
Another development in recent years has been the move to areas far from land. Certain species have been fished in the high seas for many years including tuna, salmon and squid. In the last decade, however, some distant-water fleets, facing declining stocks and increasing difficulties and costs in gaining access to EEZs, have increased their efforts in areas beyond 200 miles from shore. Squid and tuna remain major targets but high seas fishing for pollack and horse mackerel is also taking place. The amounts, and associated by-catches, are sufficient to raise issues concerning the management of these high seas resources.
Another pervasive and damaging change in the marine environment has been the increasingly severe degradation of the coastal zone. It has been estimated that two thirds of marine fish production comes from stocks which pass the first, and most vulnerable, stages of their life cycles in coastal areas.
Coastal zone damage is particularly acute in developing tropical countries where both natural and economic conditions contribute to the high vulnerability of these areas. In these countries, the growth in population and the migration to coastal cities and regions are leading to increases in municipal and industrial discharges and landfill, mangrove clearing, coral mining and other construction related damages. In some countries, siltation is becoming severe as a result of deforestation, the construction of lumber roads and land clearing. Intensified agriculture is contributing increasing amounts of pesticides and herbicides to coastal waters.
Intensive forms of aquaculture are themselves source.s of pollution. The release of excess feeds and faeces in semi-enclosed environments has already generated eutrophication problems and oxygen deficiencies which are directly detrimental to farming enterprises. In shrimp farming, the clearing of mangroves, the extensive harvesting of wild larvae and the indiscriminate use of antibiotics to control diseases are negatively affecting other important commercial marine fish stocks.
In addition, certain fishing practices are having severe environmental effects. Such practices include the use of dynamite and poisons as well as techniques in which fish are driven into nets by swimmers pounding the coral reefs with rocks, for example the muro ami fishing in the Philippines. Local populations resort to these highly destructive techniques when faced by increasingly scarce resources and a lack of alternative opportunities for employment.
In the past two decades, the degradation of the marine environment has increased significantly, mainly through exacerbated overfishing and coastal zone pollution. The trend is highly disturbing since fish are one of the major sources of animal protein and of critical importance to the increasing populations in developing countries.
The developments of the past decade have significant implications for the future management of fisheries and raise issues with regard to achieving increased benefits from existing resources. Many of the major challenges of the past decade will continue into the future, requiring significantly increased attention in order to prevent continued waste and conflict. Other developments are still emerging and are likely to lead to changes in various elements of fisheries, with positive outcomes in some cases and possibly negative ones in others.
The single most important issue that must be resolved to deal with the current massive waste in fisheries, is controlling open access. The extension of jurisdiction was a necessary, but insufficient, step in this process. Today, open access continues to exist within the common property zones of most coastal states as well as on the high seas.
The consequences of maintaining open access are extraordinarily damaging. As has been pointed out, they include the depletion of marine stocks, the dissipation of economic rents and increased conflict among users.
Conflict often occurs because of the lack of valuation of the resources. In the absence of exclusive use rights, the same stock of fish or same area of the sea can be used by different types of users. Users may be high sea fishermen from different countries or fishermen from different villages, fishing in coastal waters; fishermen using different kinds of gear, such as trawlers and stationary gillnets or traps; they may be people with different values, such as commercial or recreational interests, and fishing or mammal protection interests; or they may be groups using the environment for different purposes, such as waste disposal, coral mining and landfill. Conflicts between the different interest groups are becoming increasingly pervasive and severe.
Several studies of the amounts of rents being dissipated have been carried out on fisheries within national zones. "These estimates show that extraordinarily large economic returns are currently being wasted because of the open access condition, on the order of billions of dollars annually in resource-rich areas." Footnote 12 The losses of $250 million per year in the Moroccan cephalopod fishery have already been mentioned. In the United States, the National Marine Fisheries Service has estimated that the current gross revenue from New England groundfish is about $170 million. With proper management controlling capital investment in the fishery, the gross revenue could be $200 million and the net revenue, which is currently dissipated, could be about $130 million per year, or 65 percent of the gross revenue.
A summary of economic analyses of the amounts of potential or actual rents in Australian fisheries showed that the rents ranged from 11 to 60 percent of the gross revenues, with a weighted average of 30 percent. Footnote 13
Some speculations can be made about the global economic waste in fisheries based on the rough estimates of present costs and revenues and economic rents that might be produced under efficient fisheries management. As discussed in the section Fishing costs and revenues the current total costs in fisheries are estimated to amount to about $124 billion per year, producing a gross revenue in the order of $70 billion per year. Subsidies are presumed to cover most of this deficit. Estimates suggest that proper management of depleted stocks could increase global marine catch by about 20 million tonnes. With stock rehabilitation, gross revenues could rise to $85 billion at current prices. If the ratio of gross revenues to rents in the Australian fisheries is applied, it would mean that the annual resource rents in global fisheries would be about $54 billion per year. Removal of the subsidies of $79 billion per year would produce $55 billion annual global net economic revenues, all of which are currently wasted. This estimate (minus the costs of management) represents the potential global economic benefits that could be derived from the removal of subsidies and the achievement of effective fisheries management.
It should be reiterated that these are rough estimates and are only intended to provide orders of magnitude. It should also be pointed out that nothing has been said about the costs of achieving these rents. These costs include the direct costs of administration, research and enforcement as well as the transaction costs of achieving the necessary adjustments in capital and labour and negotiating agreements among competitive users.
Despite their shortcomings, these estimates clearly indicate that the costs of present mismanagement in fisheries are extremely high. There is an urgent need to address the problems associated with free and open access and review alternative systems of property rights, including exclusive use rights, as are now being applied in a few countries such as Australia and New Zealand as well as the Japanese community-based management system. It is equally urgent to begin placing appropriate values on the resources as a means for facilitating the resolution of conflicts. These interrelated steps are discussed more fully below in the section on Fisheries Management .
One of the particularly important characteristics of fisheries is that supplies of most wild stocks are naturally limited. Although the population of any individual stock may fluctuate in response to natural environmental changes at any time, there is a maximum yield that can be harvested on a sustained basis. Increased fishing effort beyond that point does not increase total catch and may, in fact, lead to lower annual yields. Demand for fish products, however, continues to increase as human populations expand and income levels change. The inexorable consequence is a general rise in the real prices of fish, as has been shown. To the extent that fisheries are unmanaged, the rise in prices may even cause a contraction in supply. This would occur if increasing prices were to push fishing effort beyond the point corresponding to the MSY, reducing future fish stocks even further with increased fishing effort.
On the other hand, when fish stocks are effectively managed through systems of property rights, the higher real prices increase the value of the resource itself, with benefits accruing either to the fishermen or to the management agency. In some cases, introducing more effective management leads to increased supplies and hence reduced prices.
Most major fisheries in the world have experienced significant losses in yields due to the depletion of the stocks. The rise in real prices increases the benefits of such measures but, simultaneously, it increases the difficulty of their implementing them because of the incentive it provides to invest in excessive fishing efforts.
Aquacultural Markets: Although supplies of fish are limited in general, there are certain opportunities for reducing or removing the constraints. For some species, cultivation is possible through various systems. These range from extensive systems under which the sole intervention is the planting of seeds (as in oyster farming) to highly intensive systems which require interventions over reproduction, nutrition, the gene pool and disease and environment elements (e.g. shrimp, catfish and carp in ponds and salmon in cages).
Cultivated products can be divided into four main groups. Some production is aimed at the high-income market primarily, although not exclusively, in developed countries. This currently includes salmon and shrimp but there is potential for other species such as sea bass, groupers and some marine flatfish. A significant part of total aquaculture production, in quantitative terms, is made up of molluscs, including clams and oysters (which have been farmed since the days of the Roman Empire) largely consumed in high-priced markets, and cockles and mussels which are lower priced and consumed in developing as well as developed countries. The largest group includes freshwater finfish, mostly various species of carp, which are grown in small farm ponds in developing countries. By far, the greatest amount is produced in China whose total aquaculture production is estimated to account for 48 percent of the global production of all aquacultural products. The fourth major group includes seaweeds and other aquatic plants.
The total estimated annual production from aquaculture (from both fresh and marine waters) is currently more than 14 million tonnes. The figure, however, is somewhat misleading with regard to supplies of food for human consumption. The estimate for molluscs includes the weight of the shell which is about four times the weight of the meat. Seaweeds and other aquatic plants make relatively small contributions to human consumption. In addition, the production of shrimp and marine finfish uses relatively large amounts of other fish as feed. With regard to to freshwater finfish, its contribution to food supplies is very large in Asia and significant in Europe and North America but of only negligible importance in Africa. It is currently of small but growing importance in Latin America.
The increase in production of shrimp and salmon has been very rapid, leading to adjustments in the market which may restrain growth in the short run. There are also some indirect effects and production problems that need to be solved: for example, disease associated with intensive culture; pollution from excess feeding; obtaining regular supplies of high quality feed and seed; and the maintenance of genetic diversity.
For shrimp, some of these problems are having major negative effects in several developing countries. Fairly large areas of mangrove swamps have been cleared for shrimp farms. The demand for seed has led to the intensive harvest of planktonic materials (although an increasing amount of seed is now being raised in hatcheries). The demand for feed is leading to "biomass fishing". These developments tend to reduce the potential supply of fish that can be used as food for domestic consumption in developing countries, particularly for the low-income consumers. These issues are forcing many developing countries to rethink their policies aimed at expanding shrimp farming.
Overall, the rise in real prices stimulate further increases in aquaculture production. The greatest contribution to future supplies is likely to come from increases in freshwater finfish culture and, to a lesser extent, from the culture of molluscs. In Asia, this will require increased efficiency in present culture practices. In Africa, efforts to develop fish farming have been less successful than anticipated. Improvements will require new approaches that take account of the indigenous social and economic constraints.
Development of new stocks: Demand for fish is generally limited to a few hundreds of thousands of species of marine organisms. There are certain characteristics that are important in affecting taste preferences: size, boniness, oiliness, flesh firmness, taste and colour. There are also important supply characteristics such as: ease of capture, ease of processing, and perishability. Most of the thousands of species not presently consumed or used by humans at present are likely to remain unused, similar to weeds in agriculture. Changes in taste preferences and demand do, however, take place and there are some possibilities for increasing total supplies by the development of stocks of unconventional species and by technological innovations permitting the capture of stocks that are inaccessible to conventional gear.
Within the past two decades, a number of stocks have been brought into production including: Chilean jack mackerel in the high seas of the South Pacific; several stocks of oceanic squid; orange roughy from seamounts off New Zealand (currently overfished); and Antarctic krill (to a limited extent). These developments have occurred because of changes in taste preferences and technological innovations, such as large driftnets, which make it economically feasible to harvest low density stocks.
The physical potential for development of unconventional stocks is very large, given the estimated 100 million tonnes from squid and several times that from Antarctic krill and mesopelagic species (deep swimming species of the outer continental shelves and high seas). Although squid in certain regions offer some opportunity for further economic development, it is unlikely that significant quantities of catch will be taken from krill and mesopelagic stocks for many years to come. Furthermore, in view of the fact that these are important sources of feed for other more valuable oceanic fish and for marine mammals, it would probably not be desirable to harvest them in great quantities.
Reduction in post harvest losses: A large amount of fish protein is lost after it is caught and before it reaches the consumer. With increases in fish prices and more effective price structures, some of these losses may be reduced.
There are several kinds of losses associated with fish harvesting.
The large amount of by-catch wasted in shrimp fisheries exists in most other fisheries as well. In addition, the limited capacity for storing fish in both small and large vessels, is a source of waste. When fishermen catch more valued species or larger sizes of fish late in the trip, they tend to keep these and dispose of their earlier catch by throwing it overboard. In some cases, certain management practices, lead to waste. For example, if there is a limit to the by-catch of certain species, fishermen may dispose of their excess by-catch by throwing it overboard so that they can continue fishing. In the case of the United States Pacific halibut fishery where the season lasts only one day, fishermen lay out an excessive number of longlines in order to be sure of maximizing their catch. At the end of the day, any lines not hauled will be left in the water and will continue to hook fish, including halibut. Improved management practices are essential. Their achievement would be greatly facilitated by improved valuation of the resources and by price structures that fully reflect the differences in values of different resources.
The high degree of perishability of fish leads to further post- harvest losses both on board and in processing and distribution activities. It is estimated that up to 10 percent of total food fish supplies are lost because of insufficient care in handling, insufficient chilling, pest infestation, poor processing and spoilage. The existing technology is generally sufficient to deal with these problems but the costs are high. The increase in real prices and growth in demand for higher quality products provide a significant incentive to reduce these kinds of losses.
Certain developments are also leading to shifts in supply of fishery products and may eventually produce increases in total supply. These include the development of substitute products and the possible shift in the use of certain species from fishmeal to food for humans. (See also Box 5 The role of fish in food supply and nutrition )
| The role of fish in food supply and nutrition |
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The use of fish as a source of food has increased steadily, rising from 40 million tonnes in 1970 to 70 million tonnes in 1989. Supplies for developing countries have risen more rapidly, at 4 percent per year, than those for developed states, at 1.6 percent per year¹. Quantities available to developing countries, 36.2 million tonnes, exceed those for developed countries which stand at 33.7 million tonnes. There are, however, considerable regional differences among developing countries. In 1989, supplies to Asian countries reached 26.4 million tonnes, more than five times those to African (4.6 million tonnes) and Latin American (3.7 million tonnes) countries. On a per caput basis, the developed countries have average supplies of 27 kg per year, as against an average of 9 kg for all developing countries. Fish as a source of food is critically important for developing countries where a large portion of the population receives most of its animal protein from fish. It is, therefore, disturbing to note some recent changes in fish supplies. Although per caput supplies rose in Asia by 33 percent between 1980 to 1988 (largely because of the burgeoning production in China), they fell by one percent in Africa and 4 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (Fig.A). A source of high-quality protein Fish plays a vital role in feeding the world's population, contributing significantly to the dietary protein intake of hundreds of millions of people. On a global scale, almost 16 percent of total average intake of animal protein was attributable to fish in 1988. Recent global statistics reveal wide variations in fish consumption, but people in developing countries are generally much more dependent on fish as a part of their daily diets than people living in the developed world. Only in a few developed countries, most notably Japan, does the population derive more than 20 percent of its total "meat" supplies from fish. A source of high-quality protein, fish supplies 29 percent of the total animal protein in the diet of Asian populations; the contribution to the diet of Africans is also important, about 19 percent. In Latin America, intake of fish as the main source of animal protein is sharply lower at about 8 percent (Fig. B). Programmes to develop domestic consumption, increase aquacultural development and improve the diets of the rural poor are encouraging consumption of more nutritious, low-cost fish products in this region. While overall world consumption is on the increase, fish plays a less central role in the diets of developed countries. In North America, it contributes only 6.6 percent of the total animal protein intake; in Europe and the USSR, intake is almost double at 12 percent. Demand is expected to increase in the developed countries over the next decade as the nutritive and health values of fish -- especially its role in lowering blood cholesterol levels and as a low-fat and low-calorie food -- are more widely promoted. ¹ Supplies are estimated on the basis of the production of fish for food purposes from all sources (freshwater as well as marine) plus imports minus exports and adjusted for changes in inventories. |
Development of substitutes: The demand for certain products can be met, in part, by the conversion of raw fish protein material into products with similar characteristics. As noted, the process of fish flesh extraction known as surimi is currently being used to produce substitutes for crab meat from Alaska pollack and is partly responsible, for the doubling of catches of that species in the past two decades. For high-income consumers in developed countries, these techniques reduce the importance of species characteristics and allow adjustments in demand and supply by converting low-priced species to high-priced products.
In many developing and some developed countries, it is traditional to convert trash fish and waste products into fish paste or fish sauces used as food additives. This process does not, however, offer much opportunity for expansion. If trash fish is increasingly diverted to fish feed for aquaculture there may be a loss of such forms of protein for human consumption.
Shift from non-food to food uses: Currently about 30 percent of the total world catch of fish is used to produce fishmeal, oil and other industrial products. Most of this catch comes from large-scale catches of small pelagic species for which there is little demand as food. There have been many attempts in the past to develop processes for converting this raw material into products for human consumption. Although the technology for doing so is available, the costs are still too high to attract investment as demand still appears limited.
The effect of generalized fish price increases on such possible shifts in consumption is unclear. One difficulty is that the major market for low-priced fish is Asia, whereas the major sources of the small pelagics are off Latin America and Africa. Another factor is that the growth in aquaculture is creating an increased demand for high quality fish meal. Nevertheless, it is possible that the small pelagic species may eventually provide an important supply of fish food for human consumption.
As a general pattern, taste preferences for fish are continually undergoing change. To begin with, there is low preference for unconventional species which may be sold at low prices to low income consumers. But as the prices for the more preferred species rise, middle income consumers turn to the species consumed by the poor. This causes a shift in the demand curve and an increase in price, eventually removing the species from the tables of the poor who must then turn to other unconventional species. The writer Charles Dickens, through the character of Sam Weller, noted in the 19th century, that "poverty and oysters always seem to go together", a remark that would scarcely obtain today.
This pattern, however, is being broken at both ends of the consumer scale. At the lower end of the scale, particularly for the low income consumers in Asian countries, the pattern is being broken because they are running out of unconventional resources to develop in the near shore waters. This is being exacerbated by biomass fishing, the intensive harvest of seed for aquaculture and the degradation of the coastal zone. The high and growing demand in developed countries is also leading to a diversion of resources towards those markets and away from the low income consumers, who are the most seriously deprived by the rise in fish prices.
At the upper end of the scale, the pattern is being broken because some fish products are being "priced out of the market". Prices of fish, in general, have tended to be lower than prices of other animal proteins. While this is still true for most fish products, there are some whose prices have reached a point where those of competitive non- fish products are about equal, as in the case of canned tuna and chicken meat in the United States market. When this occurs, the upward movement of fish prices is constrained.
One of the consequences of rising real prices, together with the problems of gaining access to EEZs, has been the increased fishing activity on the high seas. This activity has resulted in three types of problems. One is where pelagic stocks migrate both within and beyond 200 miles from shore. The second occurs at the edges of continental shelves where some stocks of groundfish can be found straddling the 200 mile limit. A third, not strictly pertinent to the high seas except in a legal sense, occurs where high seas exist just beyond narrow limits of jurisdiction.
In the high sea areas away from continental shelves or coastal upwellings, the density of most stocks is generally very low. For the efficient harvest of these stocks, it is either necessary to filter great quantities of water with the use of exceptionally large driftnets or longlines or to make use of natural or artificial aggregation devices (setting purse seine nets on schools of dolphins or on logs which occur naturally or which have been placed in the sea). Such high sea fishing has produced two kinds of reaction. Concern about the possible depletion of stocks and concern shown by states about the marine mammals and birds that are taken as a by-catch of the drift gill nets and longlines.
High sea fishing of salmon by Japanese vessels in the North Pacific has long been a concern to the United States and led to the signing of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention in 1952. Under this Convention, Japan agreed to abstain from high sea salmon fishing because the stocks were being managed and were fully utilized by the coastal states (the United States and Canada). More recently (in 1989), apprehensions about the by-catch of salmon in the North Pacific high seas drift net fisheries for squid resulted in observer programmes for the operating fleets. Bilateral agreements stipulated between the United States and Japan, and between Taiwan, Province of China and the Republic of Korea could eventually lead to the adoption of regulations on the use of such nets.
In the South Pacific, in November 1989, the developing island states, as well as New Zealand and Australia opened for signature a Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific. Under the Convention, member states prohibit their vessels from using long driftnets (in excess of 2.5 kilometers in length) both on the high seas and within their EEZs in the South Pacific as well as prohibiting the use of driftnets by all vessels within their zones. They also agreed not to allow the provision of services or assistance to driftnet vessels operating in the high seas or to vessels engaged in supplying the driftnetters.
Considerable attention by certain countries (particularly the United States) has recently been devoted to the issue of by-catches by these types of gears since the catch tends to include marine mammals and birds. In December 1989, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a Resolution (44/225) that all nations agree to moratoria on all large scale driftnet fishing on the high seas by 30 June 1992 unless "effective conservation and management measures be taken based on statistically sound analysis...to prevent unacceptable impacts of such fishing practices in that region and to ensure the conservation of the living marine resources".
In support of this Resolution in October 1991, the United States adopted a ban on the imports of fish caught with large driftnets (more than 2.5 kilometers in length) on the high seas. It listed as the high sea driftnetting nations: France, Japan, Taiwan, Province of China, Republic of Korea and Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The UNGA resolution contains a principle which, if widely adopted, would significantly affect the realization of benefits from fishery, and all other, natural resources. "The Resolution actually reverses the normal burden of proof to require that conservation measures be in place before the available scientific data supports specific action and before fishing may begin or be continued." Footnote 14 This "precautionary principle" would virtually prevent the exploitation of any new natural resources in international areas since it would be difficult, to determine impacts prior to their actual development. In addition, the impacts may not be so much the consequences of the technique that is used as the result of an excessive use of the technique. Any acceptable fishing gear can have damaging impacts on both target and by-catch species when it is used to excess; an issue which is not addressed by the resolution.
The other type of high sea fishing depends on the location of stocks aggregated in sufficiently dense schools to permit economically efficient harvesting. This approach is used for tuna fishing by pole- and-line and purse seine operations (although the former is decreasing in the South Pacific because of high labour costs). The major cost element in these types of fishing is the time required to search for the schools, but this has been improved greatly over the decade with the introduction of remote sensing and long-term forecasting.
In the eastern tropical Pacific, certain types of tuna (particularly large yellowfin averaging 25 kg.) are found in association with porpoises. It is economically efficient for purse seiners to set their nets around these schools but it does lead to some porpoise mortality, although techniques are available for reducing the rate of mortality. In the same area, schools are also associated with drifting logs but here the tuna tend to be smaller; less than 5 kg in size.
The by-catch of porpoises in tuna purse seine nets is not a recent development, having been a concern throughout the past two decades. Initially, the large number of porpoises taken in the eastern Pacific (700 000 to 850 000 individuals in 1961) raised the serious issue as to the ability of certain species to survive. Controls adopted by the United States led to a reduction in the number of porpoise kill to about 90 000 to 110 000 individuals in 1987 and an estimated 25 000 in 1990. Overall, the problem of porpoise kill has been significantly mitigated by implementing a combination of gear modifications and fishing manoeuvres. Purse seines have been modified with the addition of Medina panels and Superaprons so that in the final phase of pursing the porpoises could be spilled out of the net in a "backdown manoeuvre" which leaves the deeper swimming tuna in the net. Government-imposed reductions in the incidental catch of porpoises ensure that efforts continue to reduce the kill by improving the fishing methods and, by sensitizing fishermen to environmental issues.
Attempts to achieve zero mortality, however, are likely to have negative effects in two regards. First, if the goal is achieved it is likely that the yield of yellowfin tuna in the eastern Pacific would be significantly reduced, since the fishery would have to restrict itself largely to the small yellowfin tuna in free schools or those associated with floating logs. It has been estimated that this would lead to a decline in catches to one-third or one-half of present levels. Footnote 15 Second, controls established unilaterally by the United States may not be effective in preventing other countries from taking large numbers of porpoises. At present, some major United States tuna canners are refusing to buy tuna caught in association with schools of porpoises. This sanction may now be having an effect on production by other states.
In ocean regions other than the eastern tropical Pacific, the association of large tuna with porpoise schools is less strong and other means are used for locating the stocks. The development of remote sensing techniques is proceeding rapidly and may soon lead to the ability to predict precise locations of tuna schools. This technique could considerably reduce search time and costs. It could also, however, lead to the congestion of vessels on the schools and to overfishing. These various developments indicate a strong and urgent need for international arrangements concerning the management of tuna fisheries.
There is also an urgent need for international arrangements to deal with the management of the demersal stocks that straddle the boundaries between the high seas and national limits of jurisdiction. These areas occur where continental shelves and slopes extend beyond 200 nautical miles from shore: notably the "doughnut hole" in the Bering Sea between Russia and the United States; the Grand Banks in the northwest Atlantic and the Patagonian shelf off Argentina.
The "doughnut hole" is an area situated more than 200 miles from both the United States and the Russian Federation in which sizeable stocks of Alaska pollack are found. The fish have attracted a considerable fishing effort by other states and led to an increase in catches of pollack to an estimated 1.3 million tonnes. Footnote 16 It is not entirely clear whether these stocks are completely independent of those found within the national zones (as claimed by the distant-water fishing states) or are stocks that straddle the national zones (as claimed by the coastal states). If the latter is the case, then fishing within the "doughnut hole" can affect the status of the stocks within national zones.
In the northwest Atlantic, there is also a growing conflict between Canada and the EC with regard to the management of the cod stocks that are found on the outer edges of the Grand Banks. The conflict is being played out within the regional international management body, NAFO. It has also led to an evasion of management regimes, as some fishermen shifted their flags to states that are not members of NAFO. This means they can continue fishing in the area without having to comply with the regulations set by NAFO for its members beyond the EEZ. If, as is possible, fishing by these vessels in the high sea areas significantly affects the yields from the stocks as a whole, the benefits of the conservation measures will be dissipated and the viability of the arrangements threatened.
An additional problem facing NAFO, as well as other international management bodies, is that of new entrants. Under the NAFO arrangement, total allowable catches are set for individual stocks and these are then divided up into shares for the member states. According to the Convention that establishes the Organization, no state can be prohibited from joining NAFO. Footnote 17 When additional states exercise their right to join, the pie must be divided into smaller slices, thus decreasing the shares of the original members.
These problems question the desirability of the conventional approach followed by most international management bodies of determining total allowable catches and dividing them into individual national quotas.
In addition to the North Pacific and northwest Atlantic, similar conflicts are emerging between the coastal state and distant water countries fishing on the Patagonian continental shelf and slope.
There are still some areas into which jurisdiction has not been extended or where claims have not yet been put into effect. These areas include the Mediterranean Sea, the South China Sea and the Antarctic Ocean. In the first area, fishery conflicts are largely, although not entirely, bilateral issues of concern to adjacent or opposing states. A regional body, the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM), provides a forum for the exchange of information and adoption of recommendations on management measures. In the South China Sea, claims to extended jurisdiction involve significant disputes over the ownership of two sets of islands in the middle of the Sea: the Paracel Islands to the north and the Spratley Islands to the south. At present, fishing in the areas of dispute is not of major consequence. The main issue of contention is rather the presence of potential mineral resources.
In the Antarctic region, several international treaties relate to the use of fishery resources. These include the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972) and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR, 1980). Discussion on Antarctic issues now take place within UNGA. Since 1983 no change has been accepted. Footnote 18
The issues raised by these developments on the high seas were not fully addressed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. With regard to the high seas, the Convention urges cooperation among the fishing states. "States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end." Footnote 19
For straddling and highly migratory stocks, the Convention states that coastal and fishing states should seek to reach agreements on the management of stocks either directly or through appropriate subregional and regional organizations.
Although the Convention is not yet in force, most of its provisions dealing with fisheries are widely considered as a codification of customary international law. Furthermore the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, together with decisions of the International Court of Justice, UN resolutions and multilateral treaties clearly support the obligation of states to take measures to manage the stocks beyond their respective limits of national jurisdiction and to seek cooperative arrangements for such management. For straddling stocks, there is also general agreement that coastal states have a special interest and right in the conservation of such stocks. However, there is considerable lack of clarity on how these obligations and rights are to be met as well as on the scientific bases for management decisions, the kinds of institutions that might be used or created, the rights of third parties, and even the goals of management.
In this situation, pressures are emerging to take steps based on immediate or special interests that may have significant long term or broader consequences. The adoption of the "precautionary principle" is but one example. There are also pressures to extend unilaterally national authority beyond the limits of the EEZ's. In the United States, West Coast fishermen are pressing for the extension of national jurisdiction, either unilaterally or jointly with the Russian Federation, to cover the high sea enclave in the Bering Sea. Strong pressures are also emerging in eastern Canada to deal with the problems in NAFO.
Although a number of regional fishing bodies do not a good record in resolving conflicts and achieving effective fisheries management is not good, some cases indicate that improvements are possible. The first (and, in some regards, the most efficient) international fisheries agreement was created in 1911 by the Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. It was signed by Russia, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of Canada). The stimulus for the agreement was the decline in the stocks of North Pacific fur seals due to over-harvesting. The agreement stipulated that all harvesting of the fur seals at sea would be prohibited and that harvesting could only take place on the breeding islands. By doing so, the costs of harvests were diminished to a small proportion of the costs incurred when harvesting took place at sea while the quality of the furs (and prices) increased. The parties to the agreement sho relinquished their right to high seas sealing, received a share of the skins by way of compensation. When the agreement was renewed in the 1950s, Japan and Canada each received 15 percent of the skins harvested by the United States and the USSR on the islands under their jurisdiction. Footnote 20 With the extension of jurisdiction, the fur seal Convention was terminated.
At present, the FFA, whose members include the small Pacific island, Australia and New Zealand, provides an example of an effective international fisheries body. By cooperating through the FFA, these states have been able to achieve greater benefits from access arrangements than they could have achieved through individual negotiation. They have also been able to reduce the costs of enforcement significantly through the creation of a Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels.
In a multilateral agreement with the United States, the Pacific Island states are to receive $60 million during a five-year period for fishing rights. The Pacific Islands have separately agreed among themselves to share the proceeds so that 85 percent of the revenues are allocated on the basis of the location of United States catches and 15 percent is to be distributed equally among all parties. This allows those states without significant tuna resources to receive some of the benefits for their participation in the agreement.
This compensatory mechanism helps to ensure stability in the regime. The success of the arrangement depends on the states being able to maintain a united front with regard to distant-water fishing vessels and, in order to achieve this unity, the states that have rich resources are willing to compensate the less well endowed states with a share of the resource rents received.
Both the principles and the models of the World Pacific Fur Seal Commission and the FFA have much to be recommended for the achievement of effective management and the resolution of conflicts over high seas resources, even though the conditions that facilitated the success of these arrangements are not generally found in other ocean regions. The basic principle of the treatment of fishery resources as resources that have value in situ; a value definable in monetary terms. The model is that of an international regime that achieves stability by the sharing of the benefits deriving from use of the resources and providing compensation for those members who are less well endowed.
The management of straddling and high sea stocks is basically no different from the management of stocks lying fully within national zones except for the kinds of participants and the distribution of benefits. A first step would be to move from management based on physical quantities to management based on economic values. This step would necessitate the adoption of measures designed to maximize the net economic revenues that can be produced by the resources. Such measures would be based on transferable use rights which might be vessel licenses, individual shares of total allowable catch or total revenues or individual shares of total allowable investment. The choice would depend upon the characteristics of the fisheries, including the costs of enforcement.
A second step would be to provide the means for extracting the economic rents. This could be done by the auction of use rights or the imposition of taxes or user fees. The purpose of achieving stability in the regime, it would be essential that the maximum rents be extracted from the entire managed resources, whether they fall within or outside economic zones. When preferences are given to coastal states, in the form of lower payments, the coastal states tend to attract excessive efforts leading to the dissipation of rents and reduction in revenues available for other parties. The bona fide interests of the coastal states in the resources can be met through the distribution process.
The establishment of a system for distributing the benefits would constitute the third step. The benefits would be in the form of the economic rents net of the costs of achieving them. The costs would be those of the management body for administration, research and enforcement. These costs are likely to be relatively small so that there should be substantial surplus revenues available for distribution.
Distribution should be done in such a way that stability of the regime is assured; that is, that all parties feel they have more to gain by maintaining the regime than by proceeding on their own. Achieving stability entails allowing the most efficient producers to operate and compensating those who do not receive fishing privileges but who are in a position to affect the outcome of the regime. Herein lies the problem as four different types of participants can be identified. At the most restricted level, the participants sharing the benefits would include only the coastal states. Where high sea catches are inconsequential, this may be effective in maintaining stability. But where high sea catches can affect total yields, this restricted approach would not succeed.
A second set would include the present distant-water fishing states and the coastal states. This approach, currently being followed in some regions, is only effective as long as there are no new entrants from non-contracting states. However, as demonstrated, the problem of new entrants is already emerging and it may, therefore, be necessary to broaden the membership to include all states with a potential, as well as a current interest in fishing. This presents the problem of defining states with a potential interest.
The final set would be to include all countries of the world, landlocked as well as coastal. This approach does not mean that every country need receive a share of the rents directly but that the rents might be devoted to a that is generally agreed to provide benefits for the world community. It is possible to identify uses that would leave all countries with the feeling that they are better off by complying with the regime, than by breaking it.
In all cases, the amounts of shares would be subject to negotiation. Clearly, a significant proportion should be allocated to the coastal states, but the amount might vary according to the degree in which the managed stocks are found within their zones. The distant- water states, that are currently fishing in the zone, might also be accorded a significant share as a means for buying out their "historical" right of free fishing.
During the past decade, the management of high sea fisheries has appeared as a significant international problem not fully anticipated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The general response to the problem has been to modify and adjust the past forms of international arrangements. However, the treatment of fishery resources as physical quantities rather than economic resources has persisted. To continue along the same path will exacerbate waste and conflict. New and innovative approaches must therefore be adopted urgently.
The interrelationships between fish stocks and their environment have always been matters of considerable importance for fisheries. In the past decade, however, several developments have occurred that have significantly increased environmental concern. In addition to the overfishing of stocks, growing attention is being given to the possible global climatic changes and the degradation of coastal zones.
One of the basic difficulties in examining the effects of environmental changes is that of distinguishing between natural and human causes. Global ocean currents move in complex ways which are not well understood and which bring with them changes in temperature, salinity and nutrient levels. Different species have different levels of tolerance to these elements, thriving or weakening according to the mix. The changes may produce either short or long-term variations in population size.
It is well known that significant variations in stock size have occurred prior to the advent of fishing operations. Cores taken from lower sediments show interrelationships among certain species, with some dominating a biological niche in certain periods and some in other periods. The influence of natural climatic change is particularly strong for shoaling pelagic species which are caught in extraordinarily large quantities; the Peruvian anchoveta and the Japanese, South American and South African pilchard, for example. In these situations, it is difficult to separate the effects of environmental degradation and intensive fishing from those of natural climatic fluctuations.
Thus, there are not only uncertainties with regard to the degree to which global warming may occur but also in terms of the effects it may have on fisheries. Certainly, if there is a large rise in sea level, the devastating effects on coastal cities and communities will make the effects on fisheries pale into insignificance. But a moderate rise in global temperatures still deserves attention. It is unlikely that total marine fish production will change very much, although changes in the composition of species that make up the catch can certainly be expected as can changes in areas of high productivity. The highly fertile tropical upwelling zones may move closer to the poles. Changes in rainfall patterns could lead to increased erosion on formerly dry land areas, with associated increases in coastal siltation, and to decreased run-off from river basins, with associated declines in nutrients. At present, from such generalized statements, little can be said other than that there is a need to increase research on global warming.
More immediately apparent are the several kinds of changes taking place in coastal aquatic ecosystems. One is the increase in nutrient- rich wastes coming from municipalities and farms. In some cases such nutrient discharges may enhance fishery production but, more generally, they may have damaging effects, such as oxygen depletion (resulting in fish larvae kills) or blooms of phytoplankton species. The latter is often a cause of "red tides" and can produce paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP).
The growing amounts of soil erosion and fresh water run-off resulting from deforestation and certain agricultural practices are leading to increased siltation and changes in water temperatures, salinity levels and transparency, with the consequent damages to coral reefs and aquatic vegetation.
Chemical pollutants may enter the coastal zone when discharged directly into water from industrial operations when not governed by international conventions or in cases of accidents; as pesticides and herbicides run-off from farms; or as fall-out from the atmosphere. Changes are also occurring through the extraction of sand and gravel and the mining of coral, as well as through land reclamation activities, including the clearing of mangroves, often for the purpose of shrimp farming.
Pressures on the coastal zone ecosystem will increase in the future. It is estimated that, by the year 2000, 60 percent of the 3 billion people living in urban areas will be concentrated in settlements less than 50 miles from the sea, while many more will be in settlements along rivers sufficiently close to carry pollutants into the sea. Developing countries will be at a particular disadvantage in attempting to cope with the pressures because the immediate and manifest needs for food, living space and employment are likely to outweigh the less direct and visible needs to avoid damage to the coastal zone. For example, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) is commonly used and sometimes subsidized in developing countries even though the downstream damages are such that it has been banned in many developed countries.
It is estimated that 80 percent of marine pollution comes from land based sources whereas the preponderance of the harm is felt by marine fisheries and aquaculture. There is, thefore, an asymmetry between those who cause environmental harm and those who bear the costs.
The tasks of dealing with the changes in the coastal zone are multi-dimensional and extremely difficult. Integrated coastal zones management involves the international, regional, national and local levels. It also involves a variety of government agencies and private enterprises. At the international level, there is considerable need for research on a range of problems. A major area for research is that of determining the nature and extent of the damages that may be occurring from changes in the coastal environment. This requires research on the effects of environmental change on stock productivity and composition; the development of models to understand coastal ecosystem dynamics; the causes of phytoplankton and algal blooms; and the development of models for the analysis of economic relationships between the multiple sources of environmental change and its effects.
In addition to research, there are international responsibilities for aiding developing coastal states in their attempts to deal with these problems. This assistance includes education and training, technical assistance and changes in development aid to ensure environmentally sound projects. In this last regard, it is essential that the preparation of projects takes into account the full value of the natural resources as well as the costs of their management. These tasks are equally critical for national governments.
One of the major reasons for the misuse of the coastal zone is the absence of satisfactory pricing system and, as a result, the imperfect or zero valuation of the resources themselves. Access is free not only for fisheries but also for the consumption of water and the use of water as a carrier of waste. Other resources are underpriced including forest land (priced at timber value), mangrove swamps (used for land development or aquaculture) and coral reefs (as a source of building materials). When natural resources are undervalued there is inevitably a misallocation of the other factors of production (labour and capital) as well.
The provision of use rights and pricing systems can help to rationalize the allocation and use of the resources. Use rights and pricing systems can be achieved through a variety of means such as access licences, pollution permits, quota shares, user fees, taxes and incentive payments. Use rights can be provided to individuals, companies or communities. The charges for the use rights can be extracted by the government and used to protect societal interests that may not be covered by the system and to cover the costs of management. In Japan, where communities have exclusive use rights to fishing areas, those who wish to use the areas for other purposes (e.g. the construction of airports or disposal of wastes) must pay the communities for these uses.
Although the past decade did not bring any major new developments for small scale fisheries, there was a general increase in the awareness that they had been badly neglected and that development projects had been insufficient to improve their welfare. In developing countries, interest has increased in community based management of fisheries.
Small scale fisheries are important sources of employment and food in many countries throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. Although there are no accurate estimates of the number of small scale fishermen in developing countries. India, alone, is estimated to have one million active fishermen and there are well over one million in the members of the ASEAN. Many more are engaged in part-time fishing and there are large numbers who are involved in marketing and other ancillary activities. Of equal importance is the fact that the sector produces a large amount of animal protein, particularly for low-income consumers.
Despite its importance, small scale fisheries are generally characterized by low incomes and poor living conditions. Fisheries are often considered as the "employer of last resort", because of the open access property rights condition which prevails in most countries. Although social and cultural barriers to entry exist in some fishing communities, there are still many situations where fishing labour increases in spite of static or declining levels of catch. Often, the increase in fish prices makes up for the decrease in amount of catch per person; and, as in other sectors, a large part of the increase in labour results from population growth within the fishing communities.
The growth in the labour force and the inability to expand the resource base has sometimes induced small scale fishermen to engage in highly damaging fishing techniques such as the use of dynamite and poisons for the harvest of the resources, thereby diminishing the resource base even more.
An additional cause for concern in small scale fishing communities is the result of well-intentioned aid for improvement in vessels and gear. Fishermen, traditionally fishing from log rafts or small pirogues, powered by hand or sail, sustain considerable physical hardship. Motorization reduces that hardship but it also tends to reduce employment. New forms of fishing gear can have similar effects.
Since total catches cannot be increased, there is a significant displacement of labour which presents severe problems in areas of high unemployment.
In many regions of the developing world, small scale fishermen have experienced serious difficulties because of the intrusion of large scale vessels into areas that they have traditionally worked. This situation has been particularly devastating in the case of shrimp trawlers, although it is also becoming important for other kinds of gear. Shrimp stocks are generally located close to shore where they can be readily taken by motorized vessels towing trawl nets over the bottom. There are several kinds of interferences with the small scale fishermen. In some cases, there is conflict over the resources, either in terms of competition for the shrimp or because of the effects of trawling on other species harvested by the small scale fishermen. Spatial conflict occurs when the mobile trawlers move through and, sometimes, damage the stationary gear set by these fishermen. These conflicts have, at times, become sufficiently severe to result in killings and the burning and destruction of vessels.
Some countries are attempting to resolve such conflicts: in many there are bans against trawling in inshore waters. But the lack of enforcement capability generally renders these measures ineffective. In the case of Indonesia, the conflicts became so severe that all trawling has been banned from the western two-thirds of the country, thereby easing the task of enforcement.
More recent sources of distress for the small scale fishermen are the damages to the environment of the coastal zone (see Box 6 - Combating resource depletion through community participation in the Philippines. Small scale fishermen generally have limited mobility and cannot easily escape the damages to the stocks or impediments (e.g. siltation) in access to the sea.
The poverty of the small scale fishermen, however, is only partially inherent to the sector. In many situations it may be more the consequence of the lack of satisfactory use rights than an indication of fundamental inefficiency in the enterprise. Small scale fisheries in developing countries have certain economic and social advantages over large scale operations; they make less use of capital, particularly imported elements; they use less fuel; they generally use more selective gear; they are based in rural areas; and they produce food for the domestic market rather than for export.
These advantages were largely neglected, if not harmed, by former development assistance programmes supporting the construction of large vessels which encroached on grounds fished by the small scale sector. This is recognized in a number of evaluations undertaken by development agencies during the 1980s, which generally noted the high rate of failure of fishery development projects. The AsDB, the World Bank and the UNDP have all called for the redirection of support towards the small scale sector based on improved understanding of the social and economic characteristics of small scale fishing communities.
A significant opportunity for improving the welfare of small scale fishermen can be found in work of the past decade on community based approaches to the management of common property resources. There are other natural resources, besides fisheries, for which exclusive use rights are imperfect; including grazing land, forest land and water supplies. There is a growing body of knowledge showing that many of these resources have been managed effectively by communities of users under traditional rules. Although many of these systems have broken down as a result of development activities and the advent of market forces, some still exist and some have been rehabilitated.
There are several advantages to these traditional systems. Local knowledge of the resources is generally superior to that of the central authorities. Local dependence on the resources is strong. The systems provide a sense of tenure security over the resources and an incentive to manage them so as to ensure the continued flow of benefits. The systems include techniques for controlling access and sharing benefits within the community - techniques that have generally been adopted as a means to preserve community stability.
These advantages have encouraged fishery administrators to explore the possibilities of supporting community approaches to management. In the Philippines, the government has transferred jurisdiction over coastal fisheries to the local municipal governments and initiated programmes to provide fishing communities with authority over adjacent resources (see Box 6). In Thailand, some communities are experimenting with artificial reefs which are intended not only as a means for aggregating fish but also to provide physical barriers to illegal trawling. In the Solomon Islands, traditional territorial use rights systems are protected by legislation.
Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) are not feasible in all situations and they face a number of difficulties in imple- mentation. Nevertheless, together with other forms of exclusive fishing rights systems, TURFs appear to offer the greatest hope for the effective management of small scale fisheries and improvement in the communities' welfare.
| Combating resource depletion through community participation in the Philippines |
|---|
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Fisheries is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Philippines. The value of fish production grew by more than 16 percent per year during the 1980s, making the Philippines the twelfth largest fish producer in the world and the fifth largest for aquaculture. With over 7 000 islands, the country's marine area is approximately seven times larger than its land area. Marine waters cover 220 million ha including its 200 mile EEZ and more than 18 million ha of continental shelf. By 1990, the value of Philippine fisheries production was more than $2 billion, accounting for 5 percent of GNP, 5 percent of foreign exchange earnings and around 25 percent of total agricultural export value. Fish products provide half the annual animal protein available to Filipinos. Over one million people, 80 percent of whom live below the poverty line are employed in the sector. In addition, nearly 100 000 Filipinos are employed in ship building and repairs, equipment manufacturing, net rope making, ice plants and cold storage, processing, sales and distribution. Unfortunately, population pressure and the dramatic growth in fishing effort are depleting and damaging marine and coastal resources. Illegal fishing activities, including dynamiting, poisoning and fishing with fine-meshed nets are destroying coral reefs and fish populations. Unsound agricultural practices, watershed mismanagement, illegal logging, mangrove destruction and domestic, industrial and solid waste pollutants are rapidly degrading inland and coastal fish habitats. The Philippine Government reports that 70 percent of the 27 000 sq km of coral reef resources have been subjected to major damage - coral reefs fisheries account for 20 percent of capture fish production. Estimates suggest that there are less than 25 percent of the original mangrove forests remaining (mangroves are vital to marine ecosystems). The case of Panguil Bay In an attempt to combat problems resulting from environmental degradation, resource depletion, low productivity, and poverty, the Philippine Government, supported by the AsDB and the Overseas Cooperation Fund of Japan, established the Fisheries Sector Programme (FSP) in October 1989. The FSP has identified 12 priority bays to improve coastal resource management (CRM) and address the social, economic and environmental problems facing the fisheries' sector. Panguil Bay, in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, is one of the three pilot bays where work began in 1990. The Panguil Bay area is approximately 18 500 ha, with a coastline spanning 116 km and a coastal population of 450 000 inhabitants. The bay is the source of some the most valuable species of shrimp and crustaceans in the Philippines. About 47 rivers and tributaries flow into the bay. Mangrove destruction and overfishing have contributed heavily to the decline of this copious resource base during the past decade. Less than one-third of the mangrove forests remain and recent studies report that while fishing boats in the bay doubled between 1985 and 1991, the total catch dropped by 75 percent. By 1991, average catch had fallen to 1.8 kg per day per fisherman, or the equivalent of $2.50 per day. Panguil Bay's CRM component is addressing these problems through site-specific planning and implementation with the combined participation of local governments, NGOs and fishing associations. Project officials maintain that the success of the CRM depends on local community involvement. For example, the decentralization, training and involvement of local law enforcement is credited with an impressive record in 1990: local forces confiscated or destroyed about 1 600 filter nets, apprehended more than 60 violators, seized 30 scissor nets and uprooted more than 200 net posts in Panguil Bay. In addition to communities enforcing regulations aimed at protecting their resources, local fishing associations are constructing, protecting and managing artificial reef sites in the mouth of the bay to replace coral reefs destroyed by dynamite fishing. Some municipalities and communities are developing territorial use rights in fisheries, delineating zones for specific fishing gears, and establishing areas for seaweed, mussel and oyster cultivation. Coastal inhabitants are reforesting 600 ha of open mud- flats through community-based contracts. Individual families are receiving certificates of stewardship to increase land tenure security and use rights both to these reforested mangrove forests and existing forests. At the same time, mangrove zoning is resulting in commercial production zones, buffer zones, limited use zones and strict nature reserves to improve management of the mangrove resources. |
It is abundantly clear that marine fishery resources offer an opportunity for making major contributions to the growth of national economies as well as to the world's food supply. It is also clear that these opportunities have not been realized during the past decade and that, although there are signs that the process is improving, the situation is generally worse than it was ten years ago. Economic waste has reached major proportions; there has been a general increase in resource depletion, as fishing effort has moved down the food chain; the marine environment has become increasingly degraded; conflicts have become more widespread; and the plight of the small scale fishermen has intensified.
The effective management of fisheries is essential. It requires a fundamental institutional change entailing the creation of forms of use rights to the resources: licensing programmes; systems that provide individual quotas of total allowable catch or total revenue; or territorial use rights. Exclusive use rights are a basic ingredient of effective management. Wherever the open access condition is maintained, the result will be economic waste, depletion and conflict.
Effective management also requires a shift in the treatment of fishery resources away from physical quantities considered as free goods towards economic resources with specific value. This shift will occur when exclusive use rights are in place, so it is important to establish the concept of resource valuation as soon as possible. The absence of fishery resource valuation is a primary source of misallocation among different fisheries and different uses. Where the resources are valueless and there is conflict between different uses (for example, between those who fish the predator species and those who fish the prey), there is no market mechanism for determining the most appropriate mix of uses.
This is also true in situations where commercial and non- commercial uses are in conflict, such as those between tuna purse seiners and people who wish to prevent porpoise mortality. A market for the resources would facilitate the resolution of conflicts on the basis of the amount the parties would be willing to pay to protect their interests. But in the absence of a market, decisions are made on an arbitrary basis, unrelated to the relative values of the different uses. There is no compensatory mechanism that would allow non- commercial users to re-imburse the commercial users for relinquishing their rights to fish.
These steps constitute major changes which are difficult to make, largely because they initially involve decisions on the distribution of wealth. The creation of exclusive use rights, by definition, means that some acquire the rights while others are excluded. Where such exclusion affects employment and vested interests, political decisions become more difficult.
Nevertheless, the cost of maintaining the status quo is being increasingly understood. Increasing attention is being given to the malaise of fisheries and to the need for change. Several countries have already taken the necessary steps and implemented controls over access. Although these systems may contain imperfections, they nevertheless prove that it is possible to increase the contributions of fisheries to national economies to reduce economic waste. As contained in the Declaration of Canc£n: (May) "The next ten years be declared the decade of responsible fishing, so that by the turn of the century, the rich opportunities afforded by fishery resources will begin to be realized." Footnote 21
It may be possible to expedite the rate of change. For the large scale industrial fisheries where the proportion of global waste is so large (in both developed and developing countries), several policy changes may facilitate the process. The first is to remove the existing subsidies which exacerbate the waste and increase the impediments to change. The second parallel step would be to create use rights and allow fishing effort to adapt to sustainable levels. The third step would be to allow the real prices of fish to increase, thereby improving the earnings of the fishermen so that they would have greater flexibility in adapting to the necessary management measures. Finally, national governments can begin to extract some of the rents, and use them not only to help cover the costs of management but also to establish funds for the purpose of buying out superfluous capital and labour and eventually achieving rationalized fisheries.
For countries with artisanal fisheries and where overfishing exists, the process may be more difficult because of the effects of the measures on employment. At the same time it would be facilitated because artisanal fishermen are generally less mobile. In these situations, the first step might be to transfer management authority to local levels and increase the participation of fishermen in management decisions. This approach might lead to the provision of territorial use rights to small-scale fishing communities which would allow them to make their own decisions with regard to the protection of employment opportunities or the enhancement of economic rents. Another important step would be to remove the subsidies that currently support the industrial fleet and to eschew the adoption of new subsidies. Instead, such assistance should be devoted to creating alternative employment opportunities in the services sector of the fishing industry.
National governments are responsible for taking the necessary decisions. There is, however, a role for international agencies. One function would be to increase the analysis of different management systems throughout the world. The systems should be analyzed with regard to the factors that facilitate, as well as those that impede, effective management. Conditions that allow management measures to be put into effect need to be identified and alternative approaches evaluated.
Developing countries face additional constraints because of the shrinking national resources. Debt repayment problems, fiscal restraints, reduced development assistance and structural adjustment programmes are forcing governments to make difficult choices.
During the 1980s, many developing countries adopted these structural adjustment programmes which resulted in significant shifts in economic policies and, consequently in employment, consumption and production patterns. For fisheries, reduced public spending for production subsidies may improve resource efficiency over the long- term, but spending on research administration and training has been reduced, resulting in government inability to address the sector's problems properly. In addition, governments must maintain a strong role in establishing policies to improve planning, management and development of the fisheries sector. As it stands now, with subsidies in the developed countries and SAPs limiting government spending in the developing countries, the competition is unequal.
Information on management measures needs to be widely distributed so that experiences can be shared and individual countries can determine what might work best for them.
Training and education programmes on fisheries management need to be established or strengthened, not only for fisheries administrators but also for fishermen groups which may be expected to take on increasing management responsibilities.
There is also a strong need for improving economic and social information on fisheries. This need requires analyses of the costs and benefits of collecting the information and the identification and formulation of cost-effective approaches. Training and education on economic and social data collection are also necessary.
Such activities are not particularly costly but they do require a shift in priorities and emphasis, away from the traditional ways of doing business which simply encouraged fishing effort, towards new approaches designed to meet the pressing challenge for effective fisheries management.
The basis for the cost estimates of construction for the construction of larger fishing vessels ( Table 1 ), can be considered fairly reliable, since information on new construction is available at shipyards. The prices refer to vessels of different length and it has been necessary to convert them to tonnage classes for the purpose of this exercise. Average unit values for the different tonnage classes have been derived from cost information on new construction, by size and type of vessel within each class. The resulting estimate of the replacement costs of the global fishing fleet are shown in Table 2 . For the three million vessels included in the calculation, the estimated cost to replace these vessels at 1989 prices is approximately $320 billion.
In order to calculate operating costs for these vessels, the replacement value is considered to be the "best" measure. Without knowledge of the age structure of the fleet, the use of depreciation rate formulas may not be realistic and cannot be cross-referenced. The use of market value as the basis for the estimate would incur the same risk, while the insured value would cover only a percentage of the fleet. The following operating costs have therefore been derived on the basis of percentages of actual replacement values.
Table 3 and Table 4 provide annual cost estimates for maintenance and repairs, insurance, supplies and gear and fuel. The preponderance of these costs are borne by vessels over 100 GRT, most of which are insured and subject to regular surveys, especially in class vessels. Footnote 22 The total annual costs for routine maintenance ($30 billion) may appear to be high, but these should be viewed against insurance costs whereby a good maintenance record is necessary to attract reasonable insurance premiums. The $7 billion estimate of insurance costs shown in Table 3 represents percentages of actual replacement value. Costs of supplies and gear are estimated to be $18.5 billion.
Fuel costs in Table 4 have been derived on the basis of estimated number of days at sea (column 2); the specific fuel consumption in grammes per b.h.p. per hour (column 3); and the estimated percentage of 24 during which the fuel power rating is applied (column 5) by vessel tonnage class. The estimated annual fuel consumption per vessel in each tonnage class is determined by multiplying columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 by 24 hours and dividing by 1 000 to convert to tonnes of fuel.
The total estimated fuel cost is $14 billion and is within the range estimated by an energy optimization working group. It should be noted that the number of days at sea (column 2) and the operational factor (column 5) are the key variables for this calculation.
The estimated annual total costs for maintenance and repairs, insurance, supplies and gear and fuel are $69.5 billion.
With the exception of the large corporate-owned vessels operating bonus schemes, the common practice in fishing is to use the gross revenue as the basis for determining the return to capital and labour.
This is done on a share basis. Either the ratio of an equal split between capital and labour, whereby the capital share pays the operational costs; or on a ratio calculated with the operational costs deducted from the gross revenue and dividing the remainder on an agreed split between the boat share (capital) and the labour share.
From the following discussion, the gross revenue to the fleet in terms of estimated value of the global landed catch is shown to be approximately $70 billion. This, compared with the $69.5 billion in operating costs given above, leaves a margin of $500 million for capital and labour.
With such a small margin, the common practice of using the gross revenue minus operating costs as the basis for determining returns to capital and labour cannot be followed for estimating labour's share. The alternative is to calculate crew costs as a percentage of actual replacement value. This is shown in and results in an estimated cost of $22.7 billion for the 13 million fishing crews. This estimate can be compared with the results given in Table 5b where the total labour costs are derived on the basis of numbers of crew per vessel and likely earnings per caput for a total labour cost of about $23 billion.
The annual operating deficit for the world's fleet would now stand at about $22 billion. Although this figure may appear to be exceptionally large, a cross-reference of the costs shows that the estimates are conservative. The calculation of 13 million crew members is an underestimate of the actual number, given that a significant number are not recorded.
The cost of $7 billion for insurance is approximately 2 percent of the actual replacement value of the fleet.
The fuel consumption for the fleet is estimated at 46.7 million tonnes for a total marine catch of 85 million tonnes, which translates into a catch of 1.8 tonnes per tonne of fuel. On the basis of the average price per tonne of fish ($600), the above ratio becomes $1 080 for every tonne of fuel (at $300 per tonne). The estimates from alternative approaches appear to confirm that the costs and revenues are on the conservative side.
A large cost in fishing is debt servicing, which has not been included. In many cases it is this item that places the fishing vessel into financial difficulties, yet estimates of the actual cost are not available. Some debt servicing costs can be at preferentially low rates, particularly those provided through international financial institutions and bilateral assistance, whereas in most of cases, debt servicing charges are set no lower than commercial rates.
With a replacement value of $320 billion, the return to capital would at the least be equal to opportunity costs which, since there are limited opportunities for converting fishing vessels to other uses, may be lower than in other maritime practices. For this exercise, they have been set at 10 percent. The resulting costs for the fleet would increase by $32 billion for a deficit of about $54 billion. An allocation of 17 percent of revenues is normally required as a minimum to cover debt servicing, depreciation and profit margins.
The total annual operating costs (excluding labour) of the global fishing fleet, $69.5 billion, are estimated to almost equal the gross revenue, $70 billion. The opportunity costs of fisheries capital alone is in the order of 45 percent of the gross revenue Table 6 Labour cost estimates are 31 percent of the gross revenue. The percentage of operating costs, by category, of the total gross revenue of $70 billion are also presented.
The Chapter includes also a statistical Appendix 2 which includes fishery statistics shown in 28 tables. Users may like to refer to SOFA 1992 for further consultation.
| Vessel Type | Length | Material | Cost in 1988 |
| (m) | (..$000) | ||
| Super trawler | 100 | Steel | 80 000 |
| Tuna seiner | 65 | Steel | 15 000 |
| Freezer trawler | 50 | Steel | 11 000 |
| Purse seiner | 45 | Steel | 5 800 |
| Stern trawler | 35 | Steel | 4 200 |
| Scottish seiner | 25 | Steel | 2 250 |
| Scottish seiner | 23 | Wood | 1 900 |
| Shrimp trawler | 25 | Steel | 900 |
| Shrimp trawler | 23 | FRP | 700 |
| Gillnetter | 15 | FRP | 600 |
| Trawler | 13 | Ferrocement | 350 |
| Fast potter | 10 | FRP | 120 |
| Pirogue (inboard engine) | 10 | Wood | 4 |
| Vessel Tonnage Class | Number of vessels |
Average replacement cost |
Total replacement cost |
| 1989 | |||
| (.. GRT ..) | ($'000) | ($ million) | |
| >1 000 | 3 010 | 40 000 | 120 400 |
| 500-999.9 | 2 100 | 8 000 | 16 800 |
| 100-499.9 | 30 600 | 3 000 | 91 800 |
| <100, decked | 1 100 000 | 80 | 88 000 |
| <100, undecked | 2 100 000 | 1 | 2 100 |
| Totals | 3 235 710 | 319 100 | |
| Vessel tonnage class |
Average replacement value in 1989 |
Annual maintenance and repair costs as % of replacemennt costs |
Annual maintenance and repair costs |
| (.. GRT ..) | ($ million) | (.. % ..) | ($ million) |
| >1 000 | 120 400 | 7.5 | 9 030 |
| 500-999.9 | 16 800 | 4.0 | 1 512 |
| 100-499.9 | 91 800 | 10.5 | 9 639 |
| <100, decked | 88 000 | 11.25 | 9 900 |
| <100, undecked | 2 100 | 6.0 | 126 |
| Totals | 319 100 | 30 207 |
| Size of vessel tonnage |
Actual replacement value in 1989 $ millions |
Insurance as % of actual replacement value |
Annual insurance costs in $ million |
| 1 000 | 120 400 | 1.625 | 1 956.5 |
| 500-999.9 | 16 800 | 2.275 | 382.2 |
| 100-499.9 | 91 800 | 2.275 | 2 088.5 |
| <100 decked | 88 000 | 3.0 | 2 640.0 |
| <100 undecked | 2 100 | 6.0 | 126.0 |
| Totals | 319 100 | 7 193.2 |
| Size of vessel tonnage |
Actual replacement cost, 1989 $ million |
Annual costs of supplies and gear as % of replacement costs |
Annual costs of supplies and gear $ million |
| >1 000 | 120 400 | 0.015 | 1 806 |
| 500-999.9 | 16 800 | 0.040 | 672 |
| 100-499.9 | 91 800 | 0.060 | 5 508 |
| <100 decked | 88 000 | 0.110 | 9 680 |
| <100, undecked | 2 100 | 0.400 | 840 |
| totals | 319 100 | 18 506 |
| Vessel tonnage class | Days at sea | Specific fuel consumption¹/ | Installed h.p. | Operational constant²/ | Number of vessels |
| >1 000 | 250 | 0.16 | 3 000 | 0.6 | 3 010 |
| 500-1 000 | 250 | 0.16 | 2 000 | 0.6 | 2 100 |
| 100-500 | 220 | 0.18 | 800 | 0.55 | 30 600 |
| <100, decked | 180 | 0.20 | 50 | 0.40 | 1 100 000 |
| <100, undecked | 180 | 0.20 | 20 | 0.20 | 2 100 000 |
¹/Large vessel using bunker oil would have a lower cost per ton
($150-200).
²/ Small vessels usually pay higher cost (no duty free) for diesel
($350-400) and those using petrol even higher costs.
| Vessel tonnage class |
Fuel consumption | Fuel costs | Actual replacement value |
||
| Per vessel | Per tonnage class |
Per tonne | Per year | ||
| (... tonnes ...) | (..$..) | (..million..) | (.. % ..) | ||
| 100-500 | 418 | 12 796 185 | " | 3 835.8 | 2.4 |
| 500-1000 | 1 152 | 2 419 200 | " | 725.7 | 2.3 |
| >1 000 | 1 728 | 5 201 280 | 300¹/ | 1 560 | 1.3 |
| <100 decked | 1 728 | 190 008 000 | " | 5 770.0 | 15.2 |
| <100 undecked | 3 455 | 7 257 600 | "²/ | 2 177.1 | 100 |
| 46 687 265 | 14 068.6 | ||||
¹/Grammes per b.h.p. per hour.
³/Estimated % of 24 hrs at which the fuel power rating is applied.
| Vessel tonnage class | Number of vessels | Number of crew per vessel | Total number of crew | Estimated earnings per employee | Total labour costs |
| (... $ ...) | ($ million) | ||||
| >1 000 | 3 010 | 60 | 180 600 | 15 000 | 2 709 |
| 500-999.9 | 2 100 | 40 | 84 000 | 15 000 | 1 260 |
| 100-499.9 | 30 600 | 30 | 918 000 | 8 000 | 7 344 |
| <100, decked | 1 100 000 | 5 | 5 500 000 | 1 500 | 8 250 |
| <100, undecked | 2 100 000 | 3 | 6 300 000 | 500 | 3 150 |
| Total | 3 235 710 | 12 982 600 | 22 713 |
| Vessel tonnage class | Actual replacement value | Labor cost as % of actual replacement value | total labour cost |
| (.. GRT ..) | ($'000) | (.. % ..) | ($'000) |
| >1 000 | 120 400 | 2.2 | 2 649 |
| 500-999.9 | 16 800 | 7.5 | 1 260 |
| 100-499.9 | 91 800 | 8.0 | 7 344 |
| <100 decked | 88 000 | 9.3 | 8 184 |
| <100 undecked | 2 100 | 150 | 3 150 |
| Totals | 319 100 | 22 587 |
| Estimated Annual Cost | |
| % | |
| Maintenance and repairs | 42 |
| Supplies and gear | 26 |
| Insurance | 10 |
| Fuel | 20 |
| Total of above operating costs | 98 |
| Capital | 45 |
| Labour | 31 |
¹/ ($70 billion)
| Species/species group | Marine catch | Average unit value | Total value |
| ('000 tonnes) | $/tonne | US$ million | |
| Salmons and salmonoids | 876 | 3 500 | 3 410 |
| Flatfish (flounder, plaice, | 1 193 | 2 900 | 3 459 |
| sole, etc) | |||
| Atlantic cod | 1 783 | 1 068 | 1 904 |
| Alaska pollack | 6 259 | 331 | 2 072 |
| Norway pout | 350 | 87 | 30 |
| Blue whiting | 663 | 66 | 44 |
| Other cod, haddock and hake | 3 776 | 918 | 3 467 |
| Sandeel | 1 135 | 90 | 102 |
| Other redfish, basse, conger | 4 705 | 1 890 | 8 893 |
| Capelin | 898 | 100 | 90 |
| Jack mackerel | 3 655 | 90 | 329 |
| Other jack, mullet | 4 548 | 720 | 3 275 |
| Japanese pilchard | 5 112 | 203 | 1 038 |
| South American pilchard | 4 196 | 90 | 378 |
| Atlantic menhaden | 357 | 101 | 36 |
| Gulf menhaden | 583 | 90 | 53 |
| Japanese anchovy | 313 | 200 | 63 |
| Anchoveta | 5 408 | 90 | 487 |
| Other herring, sardine | 8 630 | 200 | 1 726 |
| Tuna | 3 985 | 1 700 | 6 775 |
| Chub mackerel | 1 671 | 260 | 434 |
| Atlantic mackerel | 626 | 270 | 169 |
| Other mackerel | 1 519 | 370 | 562 |
| Shark | 684 | 750 | 513 |
| Miscellaneous marine | 10 019 | 760 | 7 615 |
| Crab | 1 164 | 3 600 | 4 189 |
| Lobster | 202 | 11 270 | 2 275 |
| Squat lobster | 5 | 3 350 | 15 |
| Shrimp | 2 351 | 4 000 | 7 370 |
| Other marine crustaceans | 70 | 3 000 | 209 |
| Abalone | 85 | 4 960 | 423 |
| Oysters | 80 | 3 026 | 242 |
| Mussels | 213 | 1 260 | 269 |
| Scallops | 529 | 2 760 | 1 461 |
| Clams | 993 | 1 025 | 1 018 |
| Squid, cuttlefish, octopus | 2 545 | 2 100 | 5 344 |
| Miscellaneous marine molluscs | 216 | 950 | 205 |
| Total | 85 758 | 69 941 |
| Species group | Landed Value $ million |
Percent of total |
| Shrimp | 7 370 | 11 |
| Tuna | 6 775 | 10 |
| Cephalopod | 5 344 | 7 |
| Crab | 4 189 | 6 |
| Salmon | 3 410 | 5 |
| Lobster | 2 275 | 3 |
| Alaska pollack | 2 072 | 3 |
| Atlantic cod | 1 904 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 33 339 | 48 |
| 1971-80 | 1981-90 | |||
| Exports | Imports | Exports | Imports | |
| ............ percent................ | ||||
| Developed countries | 17.0 | 17.2 | 8.3 | 10.2 |
| Developing countries | 20.0 | 20.0 | 10.5 | 8.4 |